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TRUST IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: STATE
NONCOOPERATION AND SANCTUARY CITIES AFTER SECURE
COMMUNITIES
MING H. CHEN
INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom, backed by legitimacy research, is that
most people obey most of the laws, most of the time. This turns out
to not be the case in a study of state and local involvement with immigration enforcement, especially the federal program in which the
federal immigration enforcement agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), identifies
immigrants in state and county jails who may lack legal status and
requests that local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) detain or hold
those immigrants beyond their scheduled release for further investigation of their removability under civil immigration laws. Since the federal government’s clarification that its detainer requests are voluntary,
a significant and growing number of LEAs have declined to hold immigrants. The spread of states and local jurisdictions withholding cooperation ultimately led to a reworking of federal-state partnerships
around immigration enforcement marked by the replacement of Secure Communities with the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP).1
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Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. Ph.D. University of California Berkeley; J.D. New York University Law School. My sincere thanks to Raquel Aldana, César García
Hernández, Christopher Lasch, David Rubenstein, Juliet Stumpf, and the engaged participants
in the 2015 AALS Academic Symposium on Executive Action and Emerging Immigration Scholars Workshop. Carey DeGenaro provided valuable research assistance.
1. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the primary federal agency charged
with immigration enforcement and deportation from the U.S. interior. Secure Communities,
sometimes abbreviated as S-Comm, involves two components: first, it permits information sharing between ICE and the FBI and; second, it permits ICE requests for extended detention of
immigrants identified within the database as lacking legal status. The program that replaced
Secure Communities is named the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). Memorandum from
Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas Winkowski et al., Acting Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Nov. 20, 2014) (on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security) [hereinafter November 2014 Secure Communities Memo]; Secure Communities:
Overview and Fact Sheet, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last updated Oct. 7, 2015).

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 14 Side B

12/28/2015 14:43:02

2 CHEN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

14

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

12/24/2015 5:16 PM

[Vol 91:1

This Article is part of a scholarly project to examine cooperation
with executive action and nonbinding federal policy. In other research,
I have shown that states’ perceptions of the federal Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy were integral to the subsequent
enactment of integrative state policies that furthered the aims of
DACA.2 This Article extends those insights to another aspect of immigration policy. This Article makes three key contributions to scholarship. First, it offers a theoretical frame and empirical method for
analyzing state cooperation with nonbinding federal policies, such as
executive actions, that combines cooperative federalism with procedural justice theory. Second, it applies these theories to a timely study
of the evolving norms of state and local engagement in immigration
enforcement. Third, it extrapolates from the case study of evolving
immigration detainer policy a model of state noncooperation as policy
(re)making in immigration enforcement. It concludes with lessons for
DHS’s continued efforts to rebuild state-local cooperation in immigration enforcement.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LEGITIMACY AND UNCOOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM
A. Legitimacy and State Cooperation

12/28/2015 14:43:02

2. See Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: Understanding the Legitimacy of Executive Action
in Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (examining legitimacy as motivation for state cooperation with DACA).
3. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 215 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., University of California Press 1968) (1922).
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The concept of legitimacy is defined as the recognition of the executive branch’s authority to govern as appropriate, proper, and just.
This definition is based on classical conceptions of legitimacy originating with Max Weber. Weber defines a legitimate social order as
one where everyday citizens perceive an obligation to obey legal authorities.3 Socio-legal scholars extend this definition to the study of
legal compliance, with a prominent example being Tom Tyler and his
co-authors who state, “[L]egitimacy is the belief that the law and
agents of the law are rightful holders of authority; that they have the
right to dictate appropriate behavior and are entitled to be obeyed;
and that laws should be obeyed simply because that is the right thing
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4. Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply With the Law?, 52 BRITISH J. CRIM.
1051, 1053 (2012). Tyler and his collaborators use empirical studies to demonstrate that everyday compliance with the law is shaped not only by instrumental concerns such as incentives
and sanctions. It is also shaped by what people think about the procedural fairness of laws. TOM
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (Princeton University Press 2006) (1990). Many other studies of law and society have found similarly robust associations across cultural contexts and
substantive areas.
5. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 4, at 115–18, 174–78.
6. Id.; TOM TYLER & YUEN HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 58–64 (2002) (disaggregating process-based regulatory strategies into “motive-based trust” in authorities and procedurally just administration of laws).
7. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATION 16–17
(2011) (explaining why the emphasis shifted).
8. Id. at 23–26, 34, 42–43 (Table 1 and subsequent discussions contrast rule adherence
and cooperation under required and voluntary regimes).
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to do.”4 This form of legitimacy is based on the justice of the procedures through which decisions are made, which studies consistently
show have a substantial impact across a wide variety of contexts.5
Legitimacy is also based on inferences about the character of an authority and especially the trustworthiness of one’s relationship with the
authority; it is based on the assumption that knowing another’s character and motives tells us whether she will act reasonably in the future, whatever the outcome of the decision.6 While legitimacy may be
combined with other psychological motivations—and indeed, may
overlap with other motivations—it is distinct: the essence of legitimacy
is that the belief in institutional authority is itself a reason for obeying
the law. That sense of fidelity to legitimate authority operates alongside, and in relationship to, legal contestation. It is the main subject of
this Article.
Subsequent research recognizing the difficulty of addressing social problems without credible enforcement shifts the focus from obedience to mandatory law to deference to voluntary ones.7 Whereas
compliance is concerned with individual obedience to the law, cooperation is concerned with eliciting voluntary deference or furtherance
of the law in group settings where adherence to a binding law is not
necessarily required. Compliance is often motivated by the external
threat of legal enforcement or promise of a reward; cooperation is voluntarily given (or withheld) and motivated by internal forces distinct
from calculations of punishment or reward.8 Shifting from compliance
to cooperation leads to a changed focus on the internal motivational
forces that lead people to undertake voluntary actions, many of them
social motivations, and the discretionary quality of the actions taken.
Rules and policies can create opportunities to cooperate or they can
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constrain voluntary cooperation. Binding federal law (such as statutes
and regulations) mandates behavior and can also preempt states
from sharing in governance decisions, thereby constraining opportunities for voluntary cooperation. Nonbinding federal policies in cooperative federalism power-sharing arrangements create the conditions
for voluntary cooperation. This Article uses the example of duly enacted federal regulations on immigration detainers that give states
and localities an option to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement.9
Cooperation is foundational to society and therefore important to
understand, explain, and cultivate.10 Richard Fallon identifies three
forms of legitimacy that roughly correspond to Tyler’s motivations to
cooperate: legal legitimacy, sociological legitimacy, and morality.11
Legality is motivated by instrumental concerns, such as seeking legal
benefits or avoiding legal sanctions. Sociological acceptance is normatively and procedurally motivated insofar as it reflects people’s belief that the laws are fairly administered and that the authorities are
trustworthy. Morality is motivated by substantive policy preferences.
Importantly, the willingness to voluntarily cooperate with trustworthy
authorities and fair procedures is a signal of perceived legitimacy rather than an incontrovertible claim. Unlike legality and morality, the
sociological form of legitimacy rests on an internal definition. While it
is difficult to maintain sharp distinctions between legitimacy, legality
and morality in the presence of overlapping and mixed motivations,12
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 15 Side B
12/28/2015 14:43:02

9. Some cooperative federalism definitions are more tightly constrained to instances
where the federal government provides a block grant for states to administer in accordance with
certain spending conditions or the federal government provides states and localities an opt-out
with the understanding that the federal government will take over governance. My definition is
more flexible and conforms to other scholars who invoke softer forms of cooperative federalism
to study a broader array of power sharing agreements and policy contexts. Thanks to David
Rubenstein for pointing out the distinction.
10. The main emphasis is on procedural forms of legitimacy because they can overcome
substantive policy preferences when sufficiently strong. See also TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY,
supra note 4, at 6, 170–73 (“theories of procedural justice suggest that people focus on court
procedures, not on the outcomes of their experiences . . . if a judge treats them fairly . . . people
will react positively to their experience, whether or not they receive a favorable outcome”);
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE, supra note 7, at 18 (“The core argument is that while people
are clearly motivated by self-interest and seek to maximize their material rewards and minimize
their material deprivations, there is a rich set of other, more social motivations that additionally
shape people’s actions.”). Other definitions of legitimacy include legality and moral or substantive policy preferences. See, e.g., Richard Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2005) (describing three concepts of legitimacy).
11. Fallon, supra note 10, at 1794 (describing three concepts of legitimacy).
12. See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimacy in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV.
379, 382 (1983) (Hyde considers these distinctions inextricable and expresses skepticism of
whether they can be disentangled from other explanations of compliance such as coercion and
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the concept of legitimacy in the sociological sense is analytically distinct and worthy of consideration in its own right. Perceptions of legitimacy, legality, and morality can simultaneously be present, even if
legitimacy can also operate independently of internal assessments
that the law is legally defensible and enforceable or normatively desirable.13 Also, as Fallon points out, legality and legitimacy can inform
and sometimes constitute one another. He writes, “Sociological acceptance is a necessary condition for a . . . legal system to exist at
all,” and claims to a law’s legality can operate as signals of legitimacy
and help to build the perception of the law’s legitimacy.14 Normative
evaluations of a law’s morality or correspondence to one’s substantive policy preferences might also constitute or influence the perception that a law is legitimate.
Motivations for cooperation can be studied empirically. Observable indicia include attitudes of acceptance and cooperative behaviors.15 In terms of attitudes, the key criterion is the individual’s sense
of obligation to cooperate with legal authority—not merely out of a
sense of compulsion, but because of a belief in the legitimacy of the
legal authority that issues laws. Numerous empirical studies influenced by Tyler’s definition demonstrate that this form of legitimacy
may be expressed as a belief in procedural justice—for example, if
the legal authority was duly elected, the law duly enacted, or the implementation fairly administered—or motive-based justice when an
official is deemed trustworthy. However, few studies have examined
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 16 Side A
12/28/2015 14:43:02

self-interest). Fallon acknowledges the difficulty, but he maintains the possibility of disaggregating the three strands in a useful way. Cf. Fallon, supra note 10, at 1790–92 (“[L]aw does not
rest on a single rock of legitimacy . . . but on sometimes shifting sands. Realistic discourse about
constitutional legitimacy must reckon with the snarled interconnections among constitutional
law, its diverse sociological foundations, and the felt imperatives of practical exigency and moral
right.”).
13. Tyler’s studies show that cooperative behavior is better explained by procedural justice
and motive-based trust than instrumental variables such as punishments and rewards connected with legality. This means that there is greater explanatory power for the variance in behavior. However, it does not deny that instrumental considerations such as legality influence
behavior. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 4, at 6; TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE, supra
note 7, at 18.
14. Fallon, supra note 10, at 1791 n.7.
15. Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, In Search of Legitimacy: Toward an Empirical
Analysis, 8 LAW & POL’Y 257, 259 (1986) (delineating attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of
legitimacy). McEwen and Maiman caution scholars not to infer too much from acquiescence by
itself without additional evidence that cooperative behavior is motivated by an affirmative belief
in legitimacy. This sense of caution is important and accompanies the Article’s reliance on public
statements and legislative histories alongside the enactment of state policy.
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16. Major studies of procedural justice have been conducted in policing in Tom Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 84, 84 (2004); criminal
law in TOM TYLER & JONATHAN JACKSON, Future Challenges in the Study of Legitimacy and
Criminal Justice, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 83, 83–84 (Justice Tankebe et al. eds.,
2013); and tax law in Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 602 (2007). One of the only scholars studying
procedural justice and immigration enforcement is Emily Ryo. Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement,
More Compliance, Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 622 (forthcoming
2015); Emily Ryo, Deciding Whether to Cross: Norms and Economics of Unauthorized Migration, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 574, 574 (2013). See also Adam Cox & Thomas Miles, Legitimacy and
Cooperation: Will Immigrants Cooperate with Local Police Who Enforce Immigration Law?
(Univ. of Chi. Working Paper No. 534, Sept. 9, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658265.
17. See, e.g., Ryo, Norms and Economics, supra note 16, at 589 (survey instrument and
table summarizing survey results).

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 16 Side B

immigration enforcement.16 Survey-based studies of individuals’ attitudes toward cooperation ask whether an individual feels it is okay to
disobey a federal law; whether disobeying a law is sometimes justified; and what factors might cause someone to disobey.17 This quantitative research design is adapted for qualitative study in this Article.
This Article adapts Tyler’s framework in another way. It shifts the
unit of analysis from individual to institutional cooperation, using
states’ decisions to cooperate or not cooperate with federal laws rather than the decisions of ordinary people. In doing so, this Article
bridges the procedural justice, organizational compliance, and cooperative federalism literatures. Like individuals, public institutions decide whether or not to cooperate with federal laws based partly on
their perceptions of the legitimacy of the federal law or their belief in
the federal authorities that issued it. The cross-sectional analysis of
state motivations for adopting their detainer policies corresponds to
individual motivations. As with individuals, some of the state motivations for cooperating with federal policies are instrumental or selfserving ones—for example, obtaining funds from the federal government for necessary state programs or avoiding legal sanctions in the
form of fines or other liability. Other motivations to cooperate are
driven by normative commitments, both to procedural and substantive
ideals. A notion of procedural justice entails recognition of the federal
government’s authority to issue commands or to fairly administer a
program, notwithstanding independently held and sometimes contrary substantive policy preferences. Substantive policy concerns can
complement these procedural grounds for accepting a federal policy.
In immigration enforcement, public safety is key among them. Community solidarity is another, whether seen in community policing that
relies on relationships between law enforcement and ordinary people
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to report crimes, share information, and build a sense of community
or civic engagement that calls on ordinary people to participate in civic
channels and contribute resources of time, money, and commitment
for the sake of the greater good. The state cooperation continuum
models the decision-making process undertaken by individuals who
translate their beliefs into behaviors and the policy outcomes that result.
Admittedly, the correspondence between individual decisionmaking and institutional decision-making is not perfect. It is not always clear who speaks for the state as a public actor when the state’s
value preferences are internally divided.18 Moreover, elected officials
(such as a governor or sheriff) face pressure to get re-elected and can
use public statements strategically, rather than explaining their thinking in a straightforward manner.19 Yet the process-tracing analysis
used in this Article emulates the methods commonly used for organizational and public policy analysis20 and confirmatory evidence, such
as stipulations in litigation and correspondence, and mitigates the limitations of public statements as evidence of state decision-making.
B. Uncooperative Federalism as Policymaking in Immigration
Enforcement
Studying institutional compliance and cooperative federalism together also yields the insight that the cooperation continuum extends

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 17 Side A
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18. Political scientists routinely confront this challenge when examining Congress. See,
e.g., Kenneth Shepsle, Congress Is a They, Not an It: Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241–42 (1992) (pointing out collective action problems in entities
comprised of multiple actors and conditions of divided government). Legal scholars and judges
encounter reliability problems when using legislative history as a guide to legislative intent as
well, though the use of legislative history in courts and scholarship is as well established as it is
contested. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 18–19, 23–24, 29–37
(1997) (critiquing reliance on legislative history for purposes of discerning legislative intent). Cf.
Stephen G. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 845, 863–64 (1992) (legislative history is a valuable guide to Congress’ intended meaning);
Robert A. Katzman, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 653 (2012) (same).
19. While important considerations, these obstacles are no more present in the study of
state cooperation than when studying the political behavior of Congress. Granted state cooperation with federal laws is complicated by doctrines of preemption in some instances. This Article
focuses on arenas of shared governance as compared with arenas where the federal government commands state compliance on the grounds of these doctrines.
20. Andrew Bennett, Process Tracing and Causal Inference, in RETHINKING SOCIAL
INQUIRY (Henry Brady & David Collier eds., 2d ed. 2010) (endorsing case study methods such
as process tracing and within-case analysis as legitimate means of social scientific explanation
and advancing or evaluating alternative explanations for policy developments).
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from willing embrace of federal policy and national standards21 to uncooperative behavior that can revise, reshape or reject national standards.22 By choosing to not cooperate with the federal policy, or by
limiting participation, the state can weaken, slow, or redirect the federal mandate. In the context of immigration enforcement, where the
federal government has increasingly enlisted state-local involvement,
states and localities might resist a federal request to hold immigrants
beyond their scheduled release for transfer to federal immigration
custody by enacting state and local policies that independently govern
detainer practices or by enacting executive orders or TRUST Acts that
prohibit local cooperation under certain circumstances. And yet, in
this Article, state resistance to federal detainer requests is not considered civil disobedience in a legal environment that makes cooperation voluntary; it is part of a cooperation continuum.23
A corollary of cooperation and noncooperation at the local level—
borne of interaction and conversation between federal, state, and
county officials—is policymaking.24 The dynamic of states and localities reaffirming, revising, or rejecting federal policy can be described

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 17 Side B
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21. A classic example of a statute embracing cooperative federalism is the Clean Air Act,
which empowers California to set standards for the rest of the nation. Studies of over-compliance have focused on business firms that exceed environmental regulations. See, e.g., Neil
Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond
Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 336 (2004).
22. Uncooperative federalism is a variant of cooperative federalism. It is defined by Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken to include instances where states act as
dissenters, rivals, and challengers from their position as insiders and partners in policymaking
rather than passively acquiescing to federal policy or resisting as policymaking outsiders or
sovereigns. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1281 (2009).
23. While there has been scholarship describing the evolution of immigration detainers,
few scholars have theorized detainer practices as a case study of voluntary cooperation. Instead, other scholars have studied voluntariness as a matter of detainer discretion. Anil Kalhan,
Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1106, 1160 (2013); Christopher Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 149, 208–09 (2013); Juliet Stumpf, Devolving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times
of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2015). Those analyzing these exercises
of discretion have often assumed a binary view of legal compliance that posits the kinds of statelocal resistance to detainer requests (or other sanctuary policies) as civil disobedience rather
than a form of policymaking. Although I part ways with this conception, the binary formulation is
especially understandable where, for many years, the federal government indicated that their
requests were actually mandatory (rendering denials of those requests to be disobedient).
24. In legal scholarship on cooperative federalism, common analogies for this form of policymaking are to a layered or marbled cake. Robert Schapiro calls this polyphonic federalism,
emphasizing the possibility of blending state-federal power to produce a distinct form of governance. ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 7, 92 (2009). Environmental scholars such as Ann Carlson and Kirsten
Engel speak of dynamic or iterative federalism. Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate
Change, 103 NW. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2009); Kirsten Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 18 Side A

12/28/2015 14:43:02

2 CHEN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

12/24/2015 5:16 PM

TRUST IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

21

in terms of policy learning or policy development.25 State cooperation
with a federal policy can reinforce and strengthen immigration policy
writ large. Noncooperation can undermine, disrupt, or displace it.26
Though it may seem counterintuitive, states acting uncooperatively
serve as “servants and allies carrying out federal policy” just as they
do when they act cooperatively.27 Their influence stems from states’
and localities’ integral role as the servants of national policy, the
hands and feet executing and implementing the heart of federal policies, and their insider status.
Uncooperative federalism . . . takes place in areas where states can
take advantage of the connective ties that bind them to federal officials. While those ties may lead state officials to dissent in less
forceful or radical terms [compared to those dissenting as outsiders], they also yield knowledge of the system and personal relations
with the people best positioned to change the policy. If effective
dissent requires one to know both what to say and to whom to say
it, uncooperative federalism ought to be fairly effective.28

In the current example, uncooperative federalism led to significant reform of immigration law enforcement policy around immigration
detainers.

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 18 Side A
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Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 161 (2006) (also describing cooperative
federalism as runners passing a baton). Cf. Adam Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law 32 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 394, 2013).
25. There is a parallel social science literature on policy learning, policy feedback, and
policy diffusion that makes additional distinctions between vertical and horizontal diffusion, bottom-up and top-down diffusion, and snowball, pressure valve, and spill-over policy dynamics
difficult to distinguish. See generally PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS,
AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 17–53, 79–102 (2004); Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 365–66
(Paul Sabatier & Christopher Wieble eds., 3d ed. 2014); Keith Boecklman, Influences of States
on Federal Policy Adoption, 20 POL’Y STUD. J. 365 (1992); Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden,
Bottom Up Federalism, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825, 826–29 (2006). On immigration policy specifically, see generally KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN & PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM, THE NEW
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 6 (2015); Monica Varsanyi & Doris Marie Provine, Divergent States:
Explaining Immigration Policy Trajectories in New Mexico and Arizona (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Graeme Boushey & Adam Luedtke, Immigrants Across the U.S.
Federal Laboratory: Explaining State Level Innovation in Immigration Policy, 11 ST. POL. & POL’Y
Q. 390, 408 (2011); Laura B. Bozovic, Immigration Policy in the American States: An Event
History Analysis of State Adoption and Diffusion of the Cooperative Immigration Enforcement
287(g) Program (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama) (on file with
University of Alabama Libraries, University of Alabama).
26. Sovereignty-laden images of uncooperative federalism include one form of government threatening the other, competitive versions where one crowds out the other, or other more
conflicting versions in which states are viewed as “disobedient” or even renegade in its decision
to not align with the federal government. In the sovereign realm, rather than servant realm,
judicial doctrines such as preemption or anti-commandeering are sometimes necessary to mediate conflicts between state and federal exercises of power within shared zones of governance.
27. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 22, at 1258.
28. Id. at 1288.
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II. RISE AND FALL OF SECURE COMMUNITIES AS STATE
NONCOOPERATION
In broad perspective, dissatisfaction with federal immigration law
has led to the adoption of state laws that reshape the policy landscape
in both inclusionary and exclusionary ways. First, state laws and policies in forty-nine of fifty states voluntarily provide driver’s licenses to
undocumented immigrants who have obtained lawful presence designation from the federal government. An example of the lawfully present would be the DACA recipients, colloquially known as the
DREAMers. These policies further immigrant inclusion and extend the
reach of the federal government’s underlying executive action.29
Second, elaborated in this Article, is the evolution of criminal immigration enforcement programs and specifically state and local resistance to the federal government’s immigration detainer usage
through the Secure Communities program. Over the last decade, federal immigration enforcement has adopted an enforcement strategy
that focuses its limited resources on deporting “criminal aliens” who
are high priorities for removal.30 Partnerships between federal immigration authorities and LEAs have become an important part of immigration enforcement.31 ICE touts Secure Communities’ use of
immigration detainers in jails as a cornerstone of these partnerships.32

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 18 Side B
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29. Chen, supra note 2.
30. Jennifer Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
138, 139 (2009); César García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1457,
1472–73 (2013); Julia Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 369–70 (2006).
31. Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement,
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1819, 1849 (2011).
More information about the 287(g) program that preceded Secure Communities and its impact
on immigration enforcement is available. See MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42057, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING
CRIMINAL ALIENS 40 (2012); RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 30 (2011).
32. The use of immigration detainers predating and during Secure Communities can be
traced through numerous government documents, some revealed retrospectively in conjunction
with Congressional investigations and private litigation. See, e.g., Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Agency, 827 F. Supp. 2d 242, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(FOIA litigation resulting in revelation that ICE knew program was not voluntary despite contrary
claims); U.S. IMMIGRATION. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, SECOND CONGRESSIONAL STATUS REPORT
COVERING THE FOURTH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR SECURE COMMUNITIES: A
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 1 (2008) (listing the required
components of Secure Communities); November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note
1; Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l Law (Sept. 7,
2010) (on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) (responding to ICE’s inconsistent
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Since its origin, Secure Communities has been an information-sharing program that enables federal immigration enforcement to screen
the fingerprints of every individual arrested and held in custody so that
they can be checked against immigration records. Federal immigration authorities use this information in their effort to greatly increase
interior deportations. If ICE learns from the database search that
LEAs have someone in custody whom there is reason to believe is
subject to removal, the federal government can request that the jail
detain, or “hold,” the person beyond his scheduled release until federal immigration authorities can take custody in order to commence
further investigation or initiate removal proceedings. The 2008 pilot
program for Secure Communities operated in just fourteen jurisdictions. It expanded exponentially to reach 3,181 jurisdictions by 2013,
with nearly one million detainers issued nationwide.33
A. Shifting from Compliance to Cooperation: Immigration Detainer Requests and the Voluntariness of State-Local Cooperation,
2008 – 2010
The first step in understanding immigration detainers as a case
study of state noncooperation with federal immigration enforcement
policy involves closely examining the implementation of Secure Communities and the government’s shifting stance regarding local discretion over the detainer decisions. Language in the Secure
Communities’ detainer forms initially indicated that LEAs were required to obey federal requests.34 While it was initially unchallenged,
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 19 Side A
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responses to local efforts to “opt-out”). Christopher Lasch, Adam Cox, and other scholars provide summaries of this complicated history and explanations of critical documents, forms, and
regulations. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87,
98 (2013) (“the mandatory nature of Secure Communities was not initially made public”); Christopher Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers,
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 173 (2008–09) (describing Santa Clara’s opt-out campaign and
FOIA litigation that demonstrated “DHS’ failure to adhere to the enforcement priorities it claimed”
and “significant confusion about whether local participation in Secure Communities was mandatory or optional,” including the revelation that ICE officials had long known the program was
not voluntary”); David Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just for Restrictionists, 30 J. L. &
POL. 411, 444 (2015); Steven J. Mulroy, “Hold” On: The Remarkably Resilient, Constitutionally
Dubious 48-Hour Hold, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815, 840 (2013); Stumpf, Devolving Discretion,
supra note 23, at 1260; Stumpf, Crimmigration Crisis, supra note 30, at 391.
33. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OPERATIONS OF
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S SECURE COMMUNITIES 5 (2012),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-64_Mar12.pdf; Secure Communities: Activated Jurisdictions, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Sept. 21, 2015); Who Are the Targets of ICE Detainers?, TRAC REPORTS (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/310/.
34. 8 C.F.R. § 287 (1994).
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this language led to criticism and challenges from localities and immigrants’ rights advocates who wanted to opt-out of the controversial
program.35 In 2010, ICE began to issue conflicting statements about
the voluntariness of these requests in response to numerous requests
for clarification.36 In a 2010 briefing to the Congressional Hispanic
Caucus, ICE officials stated, “local law enforcement are not mandated
to honor a detainer.”37 Thereafter, ICE clarified in its detainer regulations that Secure Communities is an “opt-in” program and cooperation
and requests to detain were voluntary.38 In litigation following the

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 19 Side B
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35. David Martin points out that Secure Communities was initially implemented during a
period when the undocumented population was growing and many states sought out tougher
enforcement. As compared with the 287(g) task force agreements, Secure Communities was
seen as a more flexible program with more safeguards against abuse. Martin, supra note 32, at
443. Faced with changing conditions and concerns about implementation, Santa Clara County
became one of the first to opt-out. See Letter from David Venturella, Assistant Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to Miguel Marquez, Cty. Counsel, Cty. of Santa Clara (Sept. 27, 2010)
(on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security). Sheriffs working in tandem with immigrants’ rights groups prompted clarification of their ability to opt-out of the program. If they could
not opt-out, these communities claimed the program violated the Tenth Amendment’s Anti-Commandeering Clause and could also expose local jurisdictions to liability for other violations. Peter
Markowitz and attorneys from the ACLU described the blend of litigation, community advocacy,
and political negotiation that led to the crystallization of these claims as originating from in-prison
advocacy, to developing theories of statutory interpretation and substantive law (state and federal law) in briefs and demand letters to sheriff’s offices, to working with the media and community organizers to build political support that could influence mayors and governors, and to
litigation (threatened or actual). Symposium, CrImmigration: Crossing the Border Between
Criminal Law and Immigration Law, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. (2015). See also Stumpf, Crimmigration
Crisis, supra note 30, at 412; Stumpf, Devolving Discretion, supra note 23, at 1260.
36. Many examples of the changing language on detainers are available. See Nat’l Day
Laborer Org. Network, supra note 32, at 260; Memorandum from David Venturella, Assistant
Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to the Cong. Hispanic Caucus (Oct. 28, 2010) (on file
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security). Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Agency, 827 F. Supp. 2d 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), and other investigations
into ICE inconsistencies about the mandatory or voluntary nature of program upended confusing
statements from ICE in 2010 that communities could not opt-out. Subsequent revelations from
the release of documents pursuant to FOIA showed DHS’ internal forms indicating that communities could opt-out. NDLON v. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE), CTR.
CONST. RIGHTS, https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/national-day-laborer-organizing-network-ndlon-v-us-immigration-and-customs (last visited Sept. 21, 2015); Secure Communities is Optional, Harris Says, UNCOVER THE TRUTH (Nov. 7, 2012),
http://uncoverthetruth.org.
37. Correspondence and investigations described in supra notes 32, 35-36.
38. According to the Congressional Research Service, ICE detainer form I-247 has been
revised three times since 2010 in response to controversy and litigation. KATE M. MANUAL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42690, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 12 (2014). Examples
of forms include Interim Policy Number 10074.1: Detainers, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING,
http://cironline.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/ICEdetainerpolicy.PDF (last visited Sept. 21,
2014) and Immigration Detainer – Notice of Action, TRAC, SYRACUSE UNIV.,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/310/include/immigrant_detainer_form_12_2012_i247.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (revised Form I-247). Even after these revisions and DHS
clarifying guidance, some local law enforcement agencies took the position that detainers were
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amended interpretation, ICE has revised its statements to say “[a] detainer is the mechanism by which the Service requests that the detaining agency notify the Service . . .” of an alien whose immigration
status is questionable.39
Although the premise of voluntary action was far from straightforward, it was critical. Once states and counties realized they were not
legally compelled to honor detainer requests and that cooperation
was a matter of choice, a patchwork of responses arose. Studying
these responses is the second step in understanding detainers as a
case study of noncooperation.
B. State-Local Resistance to Secure Communities, 2011 – 2014
As described in the background to the case study, the picture of
state and local cooperation changed dramatically and fitfully. Notwithstanding ICE’s repeated clarifications of its detainer policy from 20102011, the number of federal requests for detainers initially remained
high.40 Rather, resistance took root in isolated communities. However,
beginning in late 2012, the number of states and counties resisting
detainer requests, or setting conditions on their responses to federal
requests, began to mount.41 According to the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, in 2013 and 2014 at least 259 localities (twenty-six cities
and 233 counties) officially restricted the extent to which LEAs may
hold individuals for transfer to ICE.42 The trend continued until November 2014, when the Secure Communities’ demise limited federal
detainer requests.43 While the number of non-cooperating localities
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 20 Side A
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mandatory until Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty. rearticulated they were indeed not mandatory. No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
39. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 641 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 42,407
(Aug. 17, 1994)). Galarza indicates that its holding is in keeping with ICE’s previous litigation
position in Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 1988). Id. at 642.
40. ICE detainer requests peaked in 2011 and then decreased until 2012 when the drop
off stabilized before becoming even steeper in 2013. See Number of ICE Detainers Drops by
19 Percent, TRAC REPORTS (July 25, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/325/.
41. Two good sources of information about state responses to ICE requests is the ILRC
map, Immigration Enforcement, IMMIGRATION LEGAL RES. CTR., http://www.ilrc.org/enforcement
(last visited Sept. 21, 2015), and the Catholic Immigrant Legal Network Report, States and Localities That Limit Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION
NETWORK (Oct. 2014), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-clinic/states-and-localities-limitcompliance-ice-detainer-requests-jan-2014 (listing states and counties that limited compliance
with ICE detainers as of Oct. 2014).
42. See CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, supra note 41.
43. This trend of declining detainers may accelerate with the November 2014 DHS guidance that ends Secure Communities and limits the routine practice of requesting detainers to
instances unless the noncitizen presents a serious danger to the community or threat to security.
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It clarifies the voluntariness of complying with the detainer request under other circumstances.
November 21 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1. Also, TRAC reports that the overall
number of federal detainer requests has declined by one-third. Immigration Detainers Decline
39 Percent Since FY 2012, TRAC REPORTS (Mar. 2014), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/370/.
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was far from a majority, it constituted the snowball leading to the avalanche that disrupted detainer practices. Understanding the thought
processes and diffusion of state and local policies that fueled this bottom-up disruption is critical to understanding the conditions under
which detainer policies evolved—and to what effect.
To preview the findings, this Article contends that states and
counties lack the motivation to cooperate with ICE detainer requests
when they perceive reasons to doubt the procedural justice of immigration detainers and when they mistrust the federal government, not
only when they fear legal liability or possess contrary policy preferences. A theoretically-drawn sample of policy responses is examined
from jurisdictions within Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada, Texas,
and others with high immigrant populations and a range of substantive policy preferences (immigration population and policy preferences are both factors found to influence policy development in other
literature). First, the Article examines public justifications for adopting
particular detainer policies in the form of legislative histories, executive agreements, and public speeches. A cross-sectional analysis of
these rationales revealed in these policy documents illustrates the
presence of legitimacy, legality, and morality motivations. While the
relative strength of these motivations cannot be ascertained from the
research design, legitimacy is a prominent motivation. Sometimes it
operates independently, and other times it operates in tandem with
legality and morality. This first set of findings speaks to the importance
of addressing legitimacy as a component (or “input”) of cooperation.
Second, narratives of state and local policy adoption illustrate how
LEAs translate beliefs into behaviors. This second set of findings illustrates variation in the extent of cooperation with federal law (an
“output”), suggesting that cooperation runs along a continuum rather
than functioning as a binary phenomenon. While the degree of cooperation cannot be predicted from the presence of a particular motivation, the narratives demonstrate the range of policy outcomes
connected with various processes of institutional decision-making.
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1. Attitudes/Motivations: Why States and Counties Do Not Cooperate
A cross-sectional analysis of the public justifications for adopting
detainer policies reveals the presence of multiple motivations for withholding cooperation. Recognizing legitimacy among them reveals the
significance of DHS addressing more than the legality or morality of
detainers in its federal immigration enforcement strategies.
Figure 1 summarizing factors influencing cooperation with nonbinding federal policy
Legality and Legal Threat
Mandatory/request - feelings of voluntariness in cooperation
4th Amendment and jurisdictional liability for holding immigrant
without probable cause
Legitimacy
Acceptance of executive authority to issue Secure Communities,
enter state-local partnerships
Attitudes toward federal government’s handling of immigration
enforcement

12/28/2015 14:43:02

Legitimacy
The narratives of states and counties withholding cooperation
from Secure Communities signal the program’s loss of legitimacy.
Consistent with Tom Tyler’s legitimacy research, states and counties
overwhelmingly cited their lack of respect for and confidence in the
federal government’s immigration enforcement efforts. This lack of respect was based on skepticism about the trustworthiness of the federal government’s motives (for Tyler, motive-based trust) and the

37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 21 Side A

Morality and Substantive Preferences
Pro- or anti-immigrant climate
Autonomous policy goals and institutional values
x Public Safety (release of dangerous immigrants into the
community following sentence)
x Community trust and Solidarity
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sense that the program was procedurally defective and being administered unfairly (for Tyler, citizens’ perception of being treated fairly).44
Secure Communities’ history was shrouded in mystery and missteps that bred community mistrust from its inception. DHS implemented its enforcement program in communities using a variety of
strategies, shifting over time from the use of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to other types of negotiated agreements, and then
altering the substance of the agreements to focus on cooperation with
detainer requests rather than access to LEA databases.45 These inconsistent and changing practices generated confusion over the mandatory or voluntary nature of local participation in federal immigration
enforcement. Moreover, community advocacy within Santa Clara and
other counties revealed misleading federal government statements
about specific requirements for local participation, presumably in an
effort to compel state cooperation with ICE detainer requests.46 These
revelations precipitated more counties seeking to opt-out from detainer requirements and calls for independent investigation of the program.47 The resulting government, nonprofit, and investigative
journalism reports show that DHS was not adhering to its stated aims
of targeting criminal aliens through Secure Communities, with high
numbers of detained immigrants having no serious criminal conviction.48 The failure to tailor detainer requests to criminal convictions
suggested ICE was using LEA as part of its general immigration enforcement effort, rather than adhering to its stated aims as a targeted
program, and that it was compelling cooperation over community opposition.49 Florida’s Miami-Dade County was one of several counties
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 21 Side B
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44. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 4, at 4; TYLER & HUO, supra note 6, at 58–64.
45. Specific accounts of DHS’ implementation of Secure Communities vary, but the basic
facts and link between elusive policies and community confusion are recounted in multiple
sources. See, e.g., Lasch, supra note 32, at 176; Cox & Miles, supra note 32, at 136 n.34;
Martin, supra note 32, at 449.
46. See also Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Agency,
827 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); UNCOVER THE TRUTH, http://uncoverthetruth.org/
(last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
47. Id. See also supra note 32 (describing investigations).
48. TRAC reported that only 14% of ICE detainers issued in FY 2012-2013 involved serious criminals and only 47% involved persons with criminal violations at all. Few ICE Detainers
Target Serious Criminals, TRAC REPORTS (Sept. 17, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/330/. Some of those lacking criminal convictions nonetheless met high priority criteria by
virtue of being recent entries or repeat re-reentries.
49. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MD., RESTORING TRUST: HOW IMMIGRATION DETAINERS IN
MARYLAND UNDERMINE PUBLIC SAFETY THROUGH UNNECESSARY ENFORCEMENT 20 (2012); AARTI
KOHLI ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY LAW SCH., SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS 1
(2011); OPERATIONS OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S SECURE
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COMMUNITIES, supra note 33. David Martin credits these “mistakes in implementation” with the
substantial opposition that followed. Martin, supra note 32, at 449.
50. See Memorandum from R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Cty. Att’y, Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., to Rebeca
Sosa et al., Chairwoman, Bd. Cty. Comm’rs (Dec. 3, 2013) (on file with the County of MiamiDade, Florida).
51. For a summary of the disproportionality argument, see Mark Noferi, Mandatory Detention for U.S. Crimes: The Noncitizen Presumption Dangerousness in DETENTION, RISK AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (Robert Koulish et al. eds., 2014).
52. Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 2011); LENA GRABER, NAT’L
IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, ALL-IN-ONE-GUIDE TO DEFEATING ICE
HOLDS, APPENDIX IV: LETTERS FROM PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR ELECTED OFFICIALS ON IMMIGRATION
DETAINERS 1–9 (2012); Jason Cade, Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court,
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751 (2013).
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that emphasized concerns about “trust” as a factor in its decisions to
not grant ICE holds.50 The “trust” issue looms large in the narratives
of noncooperation, rendering it fitting that state laws restricting county
cooperation were subsequently named as “TRUST” Acts (a double
entendre referring to the lack of trust in the federal government and
the state law’s purpose as rebuilding trust between LEAs and immigrant communities).
Some of the non-cooperating localities cited the program’s disproportionate treatment of immigrants without serious criminal convictions or longtime residents as reasons for declining detainer
requests. Illustrations reported as evidence of disproportionality included the use of detainers for pre-conviction holds, sometimes after
the triggering charges had been dropped or bail had been paid; holding U.S. citizens, Legal Permanent Residents, or other long-time residents with substantial community ties; and holding domestic violence
victims and those with traffic stops that resulted in arrests for trivial
reasons.51 Although these are legally valid grounds for removal under the multifactor provisions in sections 212(a) and 237(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), they challenged public
perceptions of fairness and proportionality. Such harsh practices violated normative values of fairness and procedural justice both related
and unrelated to violations of law. For example, Cook County, Illinois,
premised its noncooperation on concerns that detention did not constitute “fair and equitable treatment” of immigrants apart from its concerns about legal violations or liability.52
Legality
Although legality is intertwined with legitimacy in some cases, legality concerns expressed as lawfulness, legal sanctions, or adherence to legal norms are worthy of independent analysis as well. Other
than the concerns over the mandatory versus voluntary nature of the
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program, a prominent legal argument surrounding detainers was the
concern that immigration detainers violated the Fourth Amendment,
which limits the federal government’s power to conduct unreasonable
searches and seizures.53 Holding an immigrant in custody beyond the
time when he would otherwise be released—if he posted bail, if his
charges were dispensed, or if he served his sentence— is comparable to making a new arrest in violation of these requirements because
LEAs generally lack the legal authority to make an arrest based on a
purely civil immigration violation without probable cause or a warrant
for criminal arrest.54 These limitations function as substantive protections against government intrusion on individual privacy. Another
Fourth Amendment requirement is that the federal government show
that it has probable cause and execute a warrant for arrest, interposing a magistrate judge to evaluate probable cause.55 The requirement
promotes reliability by interposing an independent reviewer of probable cause and again checks government tyranny over individuals.
In exercising their choice to cooperate with detainer requests that
fall short of these requirements, some states and localities grappled
with the Constitutionality of holding immigrants or prolonging detention beyond scheduled release. Some states and counties objected
to immigration detainers outright, as a matter lacking legal authority.56
Others conditioned their response to stay within the bounds of legal
authority. A Nevada sheriff said he was willing to hold immigrants provided that probable cause and a warrant existed, suggesting that his
reluctance was not premised on the legality of holding immigrants for
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 22 Side B
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53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protects people against “unreasonable searches and seizures” and requires that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”).
54. See Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 39 (D. R.I. 2014) (“Because the state
court released Ms. Morales on bail, the RIDOC detention based on the ICE detainer constitutes
a ‘new seizure’ and must meet all of the Fourth Amendment requirements.”); see also MirandaOlivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *9, *11 (D. Or. Apr.
11, 2014) (“The seizures that allegedly violated her Fourth Amendment rights were not a continuation of her initial arrest, but new seizures independent of the initial finding of probable cause
for violating state law . . . . Thus, the Fourth Amendment applies to County’s detention of Miranda–Olivares after she was entitled to pre-trial release on bail and again after she was entitled
to release after resolution of her state charges.”).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
56. Before enacting a TRUST Act in 2013, California passed a state law that would have
barred the state from detaining individuals on behalf of ICE under nearly all circumstances, even
if they were charged or convicted of a significant crime. Governor Brown vetoed this more expansive version of the law. Recent Legislation: Immigration Law — Criminal Justice and Immigration Enforcement — California Limits Local Entities’ Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests
— TRUST Act, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2593, 2595 n.19, 2598 (2014) [hereinafter Recent Legislation].
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57. See Paul Johnson, Nevada Sheriff Vows to No Longer Hold Illegal Immigrants Without
Warrant, SANCTUARY CITIES INFO (July 16, 2014), http://sanctuarycities.info/sanctuary_state_nevada.htm. The governor of Maryland similarly issued a memo limiting Maryland’s
compliance with ICE detainers unless “the requests have adequate support for a finding of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.” Letter from Martin O’Malley, Governor, St. of Md., to
Gregg Hershberger, Sec’y, Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs. (Aug. 27, 2014) (on file
with the State of Maryland). More litigation supporting the probable cause requirement is emerging, although the requirement for a warrant remains unsettled.
58. See infra notes 100–04.
59. Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *8.
60. Fallon, supra note 10, at 1790–92.
61. IMMIGRATION LEGAL RES. CTR., IMMIGRATION DETAINERS UPDATE (May 12, 2014),
http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/immigration-detainers-update-may-2014.pdf.
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ICE per se, but on the strength of the legal claim for holding the immigrant in a particular manner.57 In a similar spirit, some counties limit
the holding period to 48 hours rather than an indefinite time until ICE
takes custody, or enact other conditions.58
Legitimacy research tells us that the loss of sociological acceptance imperils other forms of legitimacy as well. This intertwining
relationship between legitimacy and legality explains why the general
concern for fairness or procedural justice can also be articulated in
terms of legal argument. In Miranda-Olivares, a federal court declared
that detainers were not mandatory and that a state or county could be
held liable under the Fourth Amendment.59 The judicial reasoning
shows that the fear of liability is certainly related to a loss of legitimacy
and that in instances where a course of action has been ruled unconstitutional (or in grave constitutional doubt) there may be a near total
loss of legitimacy. While such a ruling functionally eliminated the
LEAs’ choice to cooperate, the LEAs’ noncooperation was neither automatic nor immediate. The legal losses engendered a loss in legitimacy once the laws encompassed values of fairness that matter
independently of liability. The laws constituted legitimacy. It is in this
same sense that Richard Fallon tells us that laws depend much more
on their present sociological acceptance than upon the legality of their
formal ratification in a legal system that utilizes stare decisis.60
Still while constitutional litigation brings the two concepts closer
together, they are not always coextensive. Sometimes legitimacy can
be separated from legality where litigation and legal threat are present. Within weeks of the Miranda-Olivares decision, fifty sheriffs in
Oregon voluntarily announced that they would no longer hold people
based on ICE detainers because of the risk of liability.61 Two counties
in Nevada (Washoe County and Reno) and South Tucson, Arizona
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changed their practices pursuant to a legal settlement.62 These and
other counties specifically cited the threat of being held liable for an
unlawful detention request given that the prolonged detention itself
would result from the state or localities’ voluntary action rather than a
changed perception of legitimacy.63 The fear of liability in these cases
is an instrumental justification for cooperation distinct from general
due process or legitimacy concerns.

12/28/2015 14:43:02

62. Press Release, Washoe Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Haley Announces the Washoe
County Detention Facility Will No Longer Accept ICE Detainers (Sept. 10, 2014) (on file with the
Washoe County Sheriff’s Office). The Washoe County, Nevada Sheriff stated that he “took a
serious look at the recent court rulings” and revised their policy to protect the county from legal
liability for violations of constitutional rights. Id. Note: The adoption of policy due to legal threat
suggests involuntary cooperation rather than voluntary cooperation.
63. See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014) (court found county
could be civilly liable for unlawfully detaining immigrant for ICE because it was not required to
comply and instead chose to do so). See also Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11.
64. Partisanship relates to the influence of political conditions and electoral incentives.
While its effect on immigration enforcement policies is established in empirical studies, it should
not be confused with the concepts of substantive policy or morality used in this Article. See,
e.g., Daniel Chand & William Schreckhise, Secure Communities and Community Values: Local
Context and Discretionary Immigration Enforcement, 41 J. ETHNIC STUD. 1621, 1635 (2015);
Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship Not Spanish, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL:
IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES. 1, 1 (Monica W. Varsanyi ed., 2010).
65. Letter from Miguel Marquez, Cty. Counsel, Cty. of Santa Clara, to George Shirakawa
et al., Chairperson, Pub. Safety & Just. Comm. (Sept. 7, 2011) (on file with the County of Santa
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Morality and Substantive Policy Preferences
Concerns about the use of immigration detainers also manifested
in reports about the program’s morality insofar as it meets independent standards of policy soundness or fits with a state or counties’ substantive values. These substantive values may either confirm or
contradict procedural values; they are distinguishable from partisanship or politics.64 Some of the most common substantive policy concerns associated with detainers included: effectiveness of the
program, unintended consequences of the program, and costs associated with cooperation.
Many counties questioned the effectiveness of detainers as a
measure of public safety or crime control. Some critics noted discrepancies between the program’s stated priorities and targeted outcomes. For example, using public data, Santa Clara County,
California and other counties seeking to opt-out cited statistics showing that 79% of those detained pursuant to Secure Communities had
never been convicted of a serious or violent offense despite the program’s ostensible focus on criminal aliens65 and other reports focused
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on trivial offenses such as a traffic stop triggering arrest for driving
without a license or the non-offense of being the victim of domestic
violence.66 Scholarly studies suggest a weak link between the activation of Secure Communities and crime control.67 New York City officials expressed concerns about the criminal justice system becoming
overburdened and diverted from its primary mission of law enforcement.68 A Warren Center report indicated that Latinos are overrepresented in the Secure Communities program relative to their actual
crime rates, despite the government’s insistence that finger printing
guards against racial profiling.69
Although an unintended consequence of detention, an Immigration Policy Report into Travis County, Texas revealed that detainers
impede access to liberty on bail and lead to inadequate trial preparation and impeded attorney access.70 Other undesirable yet unintended consequences include erosion of community trust and
undermining the community policing relationships integral to public
safety.71 Contrary to these estimations, Texas’ Harris County viewed
ICE’s presence in jails and its requests for detainers as a prophylactic
device that could reduce public safety risks by avoiding the release of
criminal aliens and grants ICE holds at high rates.72
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Clara); see also Cox & Miles, supra note 32, at 89 (using empirical analysis to discount crime
prevention as the primary motivation for Secure Communities rollout, despite putative purpose
of preventing crime and removing criminal aliens). Cox, Miles, and many others accuse the
federal government of using Secure Communities as a strategy to bolster immigration enforcement generally rather than accomplishing other stated objectives. Id.
66. Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Report
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014) (reporting on independent investigation of ICE records).
67. Cox & Miles, supra note 32, at 89 (using empirical analysis to demonstrate that highcrime areas were not a priority in Secure Communities rollout).
68. Jason Cade, Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1751, 1776–77 (2013) (discussing impact of detainers on criminal justice systems).
69. KOHLI ET AL., supra note 49, at 6.
70. Andrea Guttin, The Criminal Alien Program: Immigration Enforcement in Travis
County, Texas, IMMIGRATION POL. CTR. (Feb. 2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/specialreports/criminal-alien-program-immigration-enforcement-travis-county-texas.
71. See, e.g., Memorandum from R.A. Cuevas, Jr., Cty. Att’y, Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., to
Rebeca Sosa et al., Chairwoman, Bd. Cty. Comm’rs (Dec. 3, 2013) (on file with the County of
Miami-Dade, Florida). Florida’s Miami-Dade County adopted a binding resolution of limited compliance in 2013, citing that blanket compliance, among other factors, could undermine public
safety and trust between immigrants and police in the community. Id.
72. Lomi Kriel, Immigration Screening Still Used in Texas as Other Agencies Withdraw,
HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston/article/Immigration-screening-still-used-in-Texas-as-5828422.php.
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Distinct from morality, substantive concerns about the cost to jails
of prolonging detention without reimbursement of housing and administrative costs from the federal government were raised by those who
cooperated and those who did not. California frequently cited these
costs and sought reimbursement from the federal government
through its TRUST Act.73 The Longview News Journal and Texas
Tribune published detention costs in its newspaper, even though the
cost considerations have not changed the states’ practices.74 Again,
Harris County houses more than 30,000 undocumented immigrants
at a cost of more than $49.6 million—the highest costs of 245 jails
statewide and among the highest detainer rates in the country—and
yet it continues to issue ICE holds.75 A state law requires the cost
tracking for the sake of facilitating federal reimbursement, consistent
with a vision of federal-local partnerships in immigration enforcement.76
Some of the substantive policy concerns overlap legitimacy concerns. For example, the specter of the federal government imposing
on county jails without reimbursing associated costs or imposing on
individuals without respecting Fourth Amendment liberties could raise
constitutional concerns or legal liability. The illegitimacy of a law enforcement operation motivated by racial profiling or unable to stick to
its stated enforcement priorities could raise substantive moral concerns as well as procedural ones. Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo report on
ethnic minorities’ special experiences with law enforcement, suggesting that it is harder to overcome long histories of motive-based mistrust and ineffectiveness of crime reduction in minority communities.77
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73. Judith A. Greene, The Cost of Responding to Immigrant Detainers in California, NAT’L
IMMIGRATION JUST. CTR. (Aug. 22, 2012), https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Justicestrategies—Cost%20of%20Responding%20to%20detainers%20in%20CA.pdf (estimating cost to LA County of $113 per day).
74. Sarah Thomas, Officials Grapple with Costs of Jailing Undocumented Immigrants,
LONGVIEW NEWS J. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.news-journal.com/news/2013/oct/16/officialsgrapple-with-costs-of-jailing-undocument; Edgar Walters & Dan Hill, Texas Jails Housed Fewer
Immigrants in 2013, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/03/04/texasjails-house-fewer-undocumented-immigrants.
75. Id. Harris County spokespersons qualified these cost estimates by noting that some
costs would have been borne for the underlying conviction apart from the ICE hold and that
others are reimbursed through the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program. Id.
76. Id. (noting that “Senate Bill 1698 requires jails to track the number of inmates held on
federal detainers along with the number of days those prisoners are housed and how much the
county pays to hold them”).
77. TYLER & HUO, supra note 6 at, 141–52; David Kirk et al., The Paradox of Law Enforcement in Immigration Communities: Does Tough Immigration Enforcement Undermine Public
Safety, 641 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. & SOC. SCI. 79 (2012) (recent trends toward strict local
enforcement of immigration laws may actually undercut public safety by creating a cynicism of
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Partisanship-motivated allegiance to a pro-immigration enforcement
or anti-federal intrusion policy position could also enter the equation.
However, some of the legitimacy research defines the motivation to
cooperate on the basis of trustworthiness despite contrary substantive preferences. Least of all in these cases, policy concerns can be
voiced independent of perceptions of legitimacy or legality.
2. Behaviors: Cooperation-Noncooperation Continuum
The remainder of Part II provides narratives of policy adoption,
specifically tracing how states and localities came to their detainer
policies and to what effect. The case studies show that noncooperative behavior is the product of institutional decision-making that translates beliefs into behaviors. The case studies showcase variation in
the degree of cooperation that can be displayed along a continuum.
Figure 2 Spectrum of State Noncooperation with Detainers
Noncooperation
(California, Cook County, IL)

Limiting/ Resistance
(Oregon, MN, NV)

Cooperation
(Texas, Arizona)

12/28/2015 14:43:02

the law in immigrant communities); Rodolfo D. Saenz, Another Sort of Wall-Building: How Crimmigration Affects Latino Perceptions of Immigration Law, 28 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 477 (2013) (understanding Latino perceptions of immigration policies is crucial to encouraging more adherence
to immigration law and fostering a sense of belonging to U.S. society).
78. Cade, supra note 68, at 1817 nn. 364–65 (describing Cook County policies); see also
Letters exchanged between Toni Preckwinkle, Pres., Cook Cty. Bd. & John Morton, Dir., U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan. 4, 2012–Apr. 9, 2012) (on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) (discussing county policy of noncooperation with immigration detainers).
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States and Counties Withholding Cooperation
As relayed in the cross-sectional analysis of detainer practice,
many of the counties who declined to honor detainer requests did so
through the elimination or curtailment of their own discretion over detainers. Cook County, Illinois serves as an illustrative example. Cook
County has contested federal immigration enforcement going back to
Chicago’s self-declaration as a sanctuary city in 2006.78 Facing questionable threats from the federal government that it would cut off reimbursement of costs for LEA cooperation with the State Criminal
Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) unless Cook County cooperated
with its detainer requests, Cook County nevertheless held its
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79. SCAAP provides federal payments to states and localities that incur costs for imprisoning undocumented aliens with criminal convictions for at least four consecutive days during
the reporting period. The DOJ and DHS administer the program. U.S. BUREAU OF JUST.
ASSISTANCE, F.Y. 2013 SCAAP GUIDELINES AND APPLICATION (2013).
80. Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 2011).
81. Letter from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Toni Preckwinkle, Pres.,
Cook Cty. Bd. (Jan. 4, 2012) (on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
82. Id.
83. Letter from Toni Preckwinkle, Pres., Cook Cty. Bd., to John Morton, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. (Jan. 19, 2012) (on file with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) (defending policy of noncooperation against ICE Director Morton’s efforts to terminate it).
84. Id.
85. Letter from John Morton to Toni Preckwinkle, supra note 81; Letter from Toni Preckwinkle to John Morton, supra note 83.
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stance.79 Cook County passed an ordinance in 2011, seeking to optout rather than cooperate with ICE detainers.80 The broad refusal reflected all three concerns: legality, legitimacy, and contrary substantive policy. In 2012, the Director of DHS, John Morton, sent a letter to
the President of the Cook County Board of Commissioners to “express my serious concerns with the Ordinance,” claiming that it hinders ICE’s ability to enforce the nation’s immigration laws”81 and that
it violates INA section 1373(a), which provides that a “local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, [ICE]
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual.”82 The President of the Cook County
Board of Commissioners, Toni Preckwinkle, defended the legality of
its local ordinance with a series of letters explaining that she doubted
the federal government’s authority to compel Cook County’s cooperation. Preckwinkle pointed out that the portion of the law that John
Morton cited was preceded by the phrase, “Notwithstanding any other
provision of Federal, State, or local law.”83 Cook County’s local law
“outlines limitations for utilizing County staff and resources to respond
to ICE inquiries,”84 thus limiting rather than expanding ICE’s detainer
policy. The president of Cook County’s Board also challenged the ICE
detainers because they violate norms of procedural fairness and policy soundness. The policies treat people unequally based on their immigration status. ICE agents may access detainees if they have a
criminal warrant unrelated to the detainee’s immigration status, but
the proper way to address public safety is to detain individuals using
proper procedures related to their immigration status.85 The president reiterated that the Cook County Ordinance “was passed to ensure that detainees in Cook County are granted fair and equitable
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access to justice, regardless of their immigration status.”86 Cook
County also supported its ordinance on legitimacy and morality
grounds in the media.87
Another way to withhold cooperation is for the state to eliminate
local discretion over detainers. The states of California, Connecticut,
Illinois, Rhode Island, and Washington, D.C. enacted state legislation
restricting cooperation under certain circumstances for reasons that
mix legitimacy and morality. Each state prohibited county cooperation
with certain detainer requests, rather than leaving it solely up to the
counties to come up with their own policies and practices. In 2013,
California enacted legislation restricting LEAs from cooperating with
ICE detainer requests unless an individual committed a serious offense (defined as a violent felony) that would render him a high priority
for immigration enforcement.88 California counties responded in a variety of ways, although the TRUST Act requirements became its legal
foundation for cooperation.89 The Governor’s endorsements of the
legislation reveal that California also acted upon its perceived lack of
federal legitimacy for the Secure Communities program.90 When the
Trust Act got to Governor Brown’s desk, he signed it proudly and said:
“While Washington waffles on immigration,” he said, “California’s forging ahead.”91 Several policy justifications comport with California’s
“package” pro-immigrant inclusion positions on a bundle of issues extending beyond enforcement, including the belief that immigration status is irrelevant to the general applicability of state law or the sense
of belonging as a de facto state citizen.92 Illinois Governor Pat Quinn
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 26 Side A
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86. Id.
87. Kari Lyderson, Documents Reveal Pressure to Comply with Program to Deport Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/us/27cncimmigration.html?_r=0 (explaining Cook County view that Secure Communities violates spirit of
sanctuary ordinance).
88. See Assemb. B. 4, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
89. San Francisco complied with the Act by maintaining its own, stricter, countywide standards. San Bernardino County’s Sheriff John McMahon, who opposed the Trust Act, declared
his intention to “enact the letter of the new state law without endangering the spirit of federal
law.” Kern County Sheriff Donny Youngblood also vowed to defy the Trust Act. Recent Legislation, supra note 56, at 2595.
90. Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Brown Signs Another Bill Easing Conditions for Immigrants,
L.A. TIMES: L.A. NOW (Oct. 5, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://stoptheicemonster.org/victory-gov-brownsigns-the-trust-act/.
91. Id.
92. See Assemb. B. 4, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). See generally Karthick
Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, The California Package of Immigrant Integration and the Evolving Nature of State Citizenship, 6 POL’Y MATTERS 1 (2015).
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took a similarly bold stance in his executive order broadly forbidding
cooperation with immigration detainer requests.93
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93. ILL. EXEC. DEP’T., EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING GOVERNOR’S NEW AMERICANS
TRUST INITIATIVE (2015).
94. Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *3
(D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (emphasis added). The court further noted that the county’s continuation
of detention based on the ICE detainer constituted new, “prolonged warrantless, post-arrest,
pre-arraignment custody.” Id. at *9 (quoting Pierce v. Multnomah Cty., 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at *7 (citing Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014)).
97. Julia Preston, Sheriffs Limit Detention of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19/us/politics/sheriffs-limit-detention-of-immigrants.html?_r=1.
98. Amanda Peterson Beadle, Why 250 Counties Have Stopped Honoring ICE Detainers,
IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Sept. 22, 2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/09/22why-250-countries-have-stopped-honoring-local-ice-detainers. See also Recent Developments on ICE Holds
in Oregon, IMMIGRATION LAW GRP. (May 20, 2014), http://www.ilgrp.com/iceholds (listing of 250
counties that limit compliance as of Sept. 2014); Immigration Enforcement, IMMIGRATION LEGAL
RES. CTR., http://www.ilrc.org/enforcement (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
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States and Counties Conditioning Their Cooperation
Other jurisdictions have adopted a more measured approach toward cooperation, ironically one with discernible impact on federal as
well as local detainer practice. Rather than enacting blanket prohibitions on cooperation, judicial challenges have clarified the scope of
their obligations to cooperate with detainer requests. In Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, an immigrant charged with domestic violence challenged her detention for 19 hours beyond resolution of the
dispute against the county’s defense that “federal law requires this
custom and practice because ICE detainers (Form I-247) are issued
pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 287.7 which . . . mandates the detention of a
suspected alien by [an LEA] for up to 48 hours.”94 The court sided with
the detainee, emphasizing that the additional holding period constituted a new seizure without a new warrant.95 The court pointed out
that no federal circuit court had interpreted ICE detainers as anything
but a request.96 Following the decision, ICE spokesmen Barbara Gonzalez said the agency would continue to work “cooperatively” with Oregon law enforcement.97 Still, Oregon dramatically limited its use of
detainers thereafter.
More than 250 localities nationwide have voluntarily or involuntarily limited their cooperation with federal detainer requests via policy
or informal practice since Miranda-Olivares and other litigation setting
boundaries around their permissible scope.98 For example, Colorado
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has no statewide detainer prohibition policy and yet sheriffs in every
county have voluntarily limited detainer cooperation through changed
practices and policies.99 Some of these limitations include refusing to
go beyond the 48-hour ICE requested hold,100 defining serious crimes
that qualify for a hold (e.g., violent crimes, violent felonies, gang members),101 requiring probable cause or a criminal warrant for non-immigration related criminal offenses,102 and seeking reimbursement for
detention-related costs.103 These conditions for cooperation become
the basis for revised detainer policy and practices.
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99. Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, All Colorado Jails Now Reject Federal Immigration Detainers (Sept. 18, 2014) (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union). See also
Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union to the Colorado Sheriffs (Apr. 29, 2014) (on file with the
American Civil Liberties Union) (calling into question legal authority to detain people for up to 6
days at ICE’s request); Maha Kamal, The Latest Information on ICE Detainer Policies in Colorado, MEYER LAW OFFICE, P.C., http://themeyerlawoffice.com/ice-detainers/ (last visited Sept.
23, 2015); Kiela Parks, Is Your County Sheriff Still Honoring Detainer Requests from Immigration and Customs Enforcement?, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF COLO. (May 8, 2014), http://acluco.org/blog/map-ice-detainers (displaying map of Colorado counties no longer honoring ICE
detainer requests).
100. Boulder County, Los Angeles County, Santa Clara County, San Francisco County,
Connecticut TRUST Act, and the Rhode Island Governor’s Executive Order limit holds to 48hours or less. See S.F., Cal., Ordinance No. 204-13 (amendments to Chapter 121 of the Administrative Code) (Sept. 24, 2013); Connecticut TRUST Act, H.R. 6659, 2014 Gen. Assemb.,
(Conn. 2014); BOULDER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE JAIL DIVISION, NO. J933: POLICY ON ICE
HOLDS (May 21, 2014); SANTA CLARA COUNTY BOARD POLICY MANUAL 3.54 (2011); Letter from
Lincoln D. Chafee, Governor, R.I., to Ashbel T. Wall, Dir., R.I. Dep’t of Corrections, Ordering
Implementation of ICE Detainer Policy (July 17, 2014) (on file with the Rhode Island Immigration
Legal Resource Center); Letter from John Scott, L.A. Cty. Sheriff, to Am. Civil Liberties Union,
Describing Detainer Policy (June 26, 2014).
101. Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Santa Clara, the California TRUST Act and the
Connecticut TRUST Act define ICE’s serious offenses as recent convictions for violent felonies.
Chi., Ill., Ordinance No. 2-173 (amendment to Title 2-713 of the Municipal Code) (July 25, 2012);
Letter from John Scott to Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 100; S.F., Cal., Ordinance No.
204-13 (amendments to Chapter 121 of administrative code) (Sept. 24, 2013); SANTA CLARA
POLICY MANUAL, supra note 100; California TRUST Act, Assemb. B. 4 (Oct. 5, 2013); H.R. 6659,
supra note 100.
102. A probable cause finding by a magistrate judge is required by San Francisco County
and Clackamas County, Oregon. S.F., Cal., Ordinance No. 204-13 (amendments to Chapter
121 of the Administrative Code) (Sept. 24, 2013); Letter from Craig Roberts, Sheriff, Clackamas
Cty., Suspending Placement of I-247 Immigration Detainers (Apr. 16, 2014) (on file at
http://www.clackamas.us/sheriff/images/2014-04-16-SheriffRobertsLetterOnCourtDecision.pdf). A criminal warrant is required by Governor’s orders in Illinois and Rhode Island. Ill.
Exec. Ord. No. 15-02 (Jan. 5, 2015); Letter from Lincoln D. Chafee to Ashbel T. Wall, supra
note 100. County policies in Los Angeles County, Santa Clara County, Cook County, Illinois
(including City of Chicago), and Boulder County also require warrants. H.R. 6659, supra note
100; Chi., Ill., Ordinance No. 2-173 (amendment to Title 2-713 of the Municipal Code) (July 25,
2012); Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 2011); SANTA CLARA POLICY MANUAL,
supra note 100; BOULDER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, supra note 100; Letter from John Scott to
Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 100.
103. Cook County, Illinois, Santa Clara County, and San Francisco County require federal
reimbursement. Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 2011); S.F., Cal., Ordinance No.
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State Cooperation
LEAs can also cooperate with ICE holds, either de facto or by
policy design granting ICE detainers.104 Texas is an example of a
state in which all counties cooperate with ICE detainer requests on
the basis of de facto, local decisions (despite internal dissent in the
county housing Austin, a liberal outpost).105 While the counties
acknowledge that they are not required to obey under federal law,
they justify their choices to honor detainer requests because they fundamentally endorse the vision of shared federal-state-local immigration enforcement authority. Many Texan sheriffs believe the state has
an important role to play in detaining undocumented citizens and also
that the federal government should remain involved.106 This balancing
of state-federal interests is reflected in the issue of payment of costs
associated with detainers, which are tallied pursuant to a state bill that
requires jails to track these costs as a means of prompting the federal
government to reimburse local governments for those costs.107 The
Texas Tribune and Longview News Journal published a comprehensive list of the costs associated with keeping undocumented immigrants behind bars, but Texas did not use the cost counting as a
reason to opt out of honoring detainers. Instead, it counted costs to
increase federal accountability for the fiscal effects of detainers, not
to rewrite those policies.108 To the extent that the high cost of housing
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204-13 (amendments to Chapter 121 of the Administrative Code) (Sept. 24, 2013); SANTA
CLARA POLICY MANUAL, supra note 100.
104. Prior to Secure Communities, the federal government relied on 287(g) agreements that
empowered state and local law enforcement to directly enforce federal immigration law. Those
agreements fell into disfavor after the 2012 Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. United States,
and were significantly defunded in the 2013 appropriations.
105. See States and Localities That Limit Compliance with ICE Detainer Requests,
CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK (Oct. 2014), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articlesclinic/states-and-localities-limit-compliance-ice-detainer-requests-jan-2014 (listing states and
counties that limited compliance with ICE detainers as of Oct. 2014). In response to the question
“How many sheriff’s offices in Texas do not participate in this program?” the Sheriff’s Office
stated that it is “not aware of any Texas Sheriff who has decided that they will no longer honor
federal detainers or not send in fingerprints in accordance with the law.” ICE Detainers FAQs,
TRAVIS CTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, https://www.tcsheriff.org/inmate-jail-info/ice-detainers-faqs (last
visited Sept. 24, 2015).
106. As an example, a spokesperson for the Harris County Sheriff’s office described the
local practice of immigration detainers by saying: “At large, urban jails like Harris County’s, ICE
picks up Monday through Friday.” Edgar Walters & Dan Hill, Texas Jails Housed Fewer Immigrants in 2013, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/03/04/texas-jailshouse-fewer-undocumented-immigrants.
107. S.B. 1698, 82d Leg. (Tex. 2011).
108. See Thomas, supra note 74; Walters & Hill, supra note 74.
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immigrants beyond their anticipated stay was a concern, it was outweighed by Texas’ belief in the legitimacy of the state-federal enforcement arrangement.
Apart from cost, Texan counties support the policy soundness of
LEAs issuing immigration detainers—a convergence of local and federal policy that makes cooperation easier—especially due to their
strong concerns for border control and public safety risks presented
by criminal aliens. As one conservative immigration organization
pointed out:
Enforcement opponents argue that localities could save money
by refusing to comply with ICE detainers. Many Texas sheriffs disagree, citing the potential threat to the public of releasing criminal
aliens and the need for enforcement to deter cross-border criminal
activity, including human and drugsmuggling that are encouraged
when the government tolerates illegal immigration.109

12/28/2015 14:43:02

109. Jessica Vaughan, Texas Data Confirm Declining Deportations, Cost of Alien Crime,
CTR. IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Mar. 5, 2014), http://cis.org/vaughan/texas-data-confirm-decliningdeportations-cost-alien-crime.
110. Press Release, Travis Cty. Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Greg Hamilton Continues Honoring
ICE Detainers (2014) (on file at https://www.tcsheriff.org/about/media-relations/press-releases/2014/261-sheriff-greg-hamilton-continues-honoring-ice-detainers).
111. Id. See also Lomi Kriel, Immigration Screening Still Used in Texas as Other Agencies
Withdraw, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 16, 2014), http://houstonchronicle.com/news/houstontexas/houston/article/Immigration-screening-still-used-in-Texas-as-5828422.php.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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The Travis County Sheriff Greg Hamilton is cognizant of legal
challenges to immigration detainers.110 Still, the sheriff’s office defends the county’s decision as being within the scope of lawful activity
because there is no risk of extended detentions when ICE operates
within the jail and makes requests prior to release.111 Harris County
Sheriff Adrian Garcia, whose county leads the state in detainers and
who has been a vocal supporter of their use,112 similarly believes that
state cooperation with federally-requested immigration detainers are
legitimate and are only called into question when the policies are not
properly or carefully implemented. He defends his county’s use of detainers within the jails, prior to release, on similar grounds to Travis
County’s reasoning.113
In contrast to Texas’s uniform, though localized, policies, Arizona
counties adopt a patchwork of policies on immigration detainers in the
years since its pro-immigration enforcement law, SB 1070, was struck
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down in 2012.114 Most famously, Maricopa County (including Phoenix)
grants the highest number of detainers in the nation.115 The Sheriff of
Maricopa County, Joe Arpaio, has been an avid supporter of the Secure Communities program and believes that immigration detainers
are a legitimate and necessary program.116 Despite the November
2014 executive actions ending Secure Communities and lawsuits
finding racial profiling in his immigration enforcement efforts, he continues to cooperate to the fullest extent possible with ICE and exhorts
the federal government to do more to enforce immigration laws.117
While not every Arizonan county cooperates with detainers to the extent of Maricopa County, most counties tend to cooperate with federal
detainer policy and share the sense that states and the federal government both have a place in immigration enforcement. South Tucson
is a lonely exception that limits compliance following settlement of a
lawsuit challenging its practices, suggesting that South Tucson is accommodating evolving legal norms rather than acceding voluntarily.118
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114. Arizona has a history of robust immigration enforcement. SB 1070 strengthened state
immigration enforcement in several ways, on the theory that the state would compensate for the
federal government’s lax enforcement of immigration law. Arizona v. United States enjoined
most SB 1070 provisions, including a provision permitting warrantless arrest for probable cause
that a person committed crimes that would make him removable. See 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497,
2507 (2012). Since 2012, many 287(g) agreements that empowered states to initiate these
kinds of immigration-related arrests have been terminated and emphasis has shifted toward the
use of federal ICE holds under Secure Communities.
115. Immigration Holds at Maricopa County Jail in Arizona Top Nation, Study Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/26/immigrationholds-at-maricopa-county-jail_n_2767417.html.
116. See, e.g., Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772, 772 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
Proposition 100, which precludes bail for certain felony offenses for unlawfully present noncitizens, violates substantive due process); Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012)
(granting preliminary injunction prohibiting detaining or stopping individuals for traffic stop based
solely on suspicions of unlawful presence). Sheriff Arpaio sued President Obama following the
November 2014 executive actions, but his lawsuit was dismissed for lack of standing. Arpaio v.
Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185 (D.D.C. 2014).
117. Id.
118. South Tucson limited its detainer practices as the result of a lawsuit brought on behalf
of a detainee by the ACLU. As part of the settlement, South Tucson made it unlawful to detain
an individual unless there is probable cause to suspect that the individual has committed or is
about to commit a crime. See SOUTH TUCSON POLICE DEP’T, IMMIGRATION POLICY 3 (2014). The
lawsuit stemmed from SB 1070, which was struck down. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510.
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III. RESTORING TRUST IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: STATE
NONCOOPERATION AND SANCTUARY CITIES AFTER SECURE
COMMUNITIES
Part II provided an in-depth look at states and localities rewriting
immigration enforcement policy by declining to cooperate with federal
detainer requests. This Part narrates the next stage of policy development: the federal government’s efforts to restructure its partnership
with LEAs while simultaneously limiting local influence in response to
pressure from below. The policy developments illustrate the limits of
top-down federal executive action and specifically what happens
when states and localities refuse to cooperate with federal policy from
below.
A. PEP Policy Reforms, November 2014

12/28/2015 14:43:02

119. For example, numerous congressional and executive investigations led to an ICE report. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, ICE OFFICE OF THE DIR., PROTECTING THE HOMELAND:
ICE RESPONSE TO SECURE COMMUNITIES TASK FORCE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2
(2012). The report cites misunderstandings regarding role of local law enforcement, perceived
inconsistencies between S-Comm goals and outcomes for high and low level bureaucracies
(e.g. binding criteria and field enforcement), and unintended consequences for communities. It
concludes with a section asking “Whether to suspend S-Comm.” Id. at 10, 12, 13.
120. November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1.
121. Id.; Request for Voluntary Notification of Release of Suspected Priority, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC.,
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After confronting years of criticism, the federal government reformulated its immigration detainer policies by rescinding Secure Communities and substituting PEP through an executive action in
November 2014.119 Although the premise of federal-state-local partnership in both immigration enforcement programs is the same, and
FBI and ICE will continue to share fingerprint data for purposes of
identifying potentially removable individuals, the revamped detainer
policy scales back ICE’s requests for state-local cooperation. The November 2014 immigration executive action announced “[t]he Secure
Communities program, as we know it, will be discontinued.”120 In its
place, PEP limits federal requests for immigration detainers in important respects. First, rather than asking LEAs to hold detained immigrants beyond their scheduled release from jail, ICE seeks
notification of release dates from LEAs of scheduled release in most
circumstances.121 Second, ICE will only request an LEA hold an immigrant for transfer of custody in “special circumstances,” such as
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when the immigrant in custody has been convicted of a serious crime
or poses a national security risk and there is probable cause that the
immigrant is subject to a final removal order.122 The Revised Form I247D for detainers also asks that the LEA hold the named individual
for no more than 48 hours, without listing exceptions.123 Other details
of PEP’s operation will be worked out through additional guidance and
developing practice. Whatever else changes, these two policy
changes alone should result in fewer and more tailored federal detainer requests. A Migration Policy Report estimates that the more
precise and narrowly-tailored priorities memo in combination with
PEP will reduce the total number of deportations from the interior by
approximately 25,000.124
While the substantive changes are somewhat significant,125 what
is most noteworthy about the November 2014 fall of Secure Communities is the way it reached its demise. The DHS memo itself credits
the federal-state-local controversies with providing specific ideas for
policy development, implying that the federal government learned
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https://www.aclu.org/files/field_document/I-247N%20Request%20for%20Notification%20SAMPLE.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (Form I-247N – Request for Voluntary Notification of Release of Suspected Priority Alien). This newly-drafted form requires ICE to state the
basis for suspecting that an individual falls within ICE’s enforcement priorities related to criminal
conviction or national security. It does not reference enforcement priorities based on civil immigration violations only, such as recent border crossing.
122. November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1; Immigration Detainer –
Notice of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (Form I-247D Immigration
Detainer – Request for Voluntary Action). This revised form requires ICE to specify the criminal
conviction or national security risk that renders the immigrant a high priority under the DHS
enforcement guidance and to explain why ICE believes there is probable cause that the individual is removable. CRIMMIGRATION, http://crimmigration.com (last visited Sept. 23, 2015).
123. November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1; Immigration Detainer –
Notice of Action, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2015) (Form I-247D Immigration
Detainer – Request for Voluntary Action).
124. This number could be offset by increased apprehensions at the border, which are a
higher priority under the 2014 DHS memo. Marc Rosenblum, Understanding the Potential Impact of Executive Action on Immigration Enforcement, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (July 2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/understanding-potential-impact-executive-action-immigration-enforcement.
125. Immigration experts disagree on how meaningful the changes will be. See, e.g., César
García Hernández, PEP v. Secure Communities, CRIMMIGRATION (July 8, 2015), http://crimmigration.com/2015/07/07/pep-vs-secure-communities/; Gabriela Mendez, Let’s Have a PEP
Talk: Is This S-Comm 2.0?, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (May 28, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/05/lets-have-a-pep-talk-is-this-s-comm-20.html; Cf. Suzy
Khimm, Building a Kindler, Gentler Deportation Machine, NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2015),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/122387/building-kinder-gentler-deportation-machine; Rosenblum, supra note 124.
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from state and local feedback.126 This federal government’s responsiveness toward local resistance is conspicuous evidence that uncooperative federalism influenced federal policy development. That is,
states and localities (often at the behest of immigration advocates)
voiced their dissatisfaction and their concerns were heard—at least in
the two respects described and incorporated into the revamped policy. The DHS memo mentions the state and local resistance to Secure
Communities on Fourth Amendment and other grounds as part of its
justification for ending the program:
[Secure Communities] has attracted a great deal of criticism, is
widely misunderstood, and is embroiled in litigation; its very name
has become a symbol for general hostility toward the enforcement
of our immigration laws. Governors, mayors, and state and local
law enforcement officials around the country have increasingly refused to cooperate with the program, and many have issued executive orders or signed laws prohibiting such cooperation.127

Going beyond its references to the Fourth Amendment litigation,
the DHS memo expressly references the lack of public confidence in
immigration detainer practices and seems to recognize the value of
public participation and trust-building between LEAs and federal law
enforcement in its closing paragraph:
[A]cquainting state and local governments, and their law enforcement components, with this policy change will be crucial to its success. I therefore direct the Assistant Secretary for
Intergovernmental Affairs to formulate a plan and coordinate an effort to engage state and local governments about this and related
changes to our enforcement policies. I am willing to personally participate in these discussions.128

12/28/2015 14:43:02

126. See November 2014 Secure Communities Memo, supra note 1 (referencing Fourth
Amendment litigation).
127. See Id.
128. Id.
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Whether or not DHS can succeed in rebuilding community trust
around partnerships with law enforcement—especially among those
who fundamentally disbelieve that LEAs should be involved in immigration enforcement or who fundamentally challenge civil immigration
detention—the DHS memo recognizes that substantive reform will not
be enough; it is not just what happens that needs to change, but the
way things happen that needs to change.
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B. PEP Implementation, July 2015 to Present

12/28/2015 14:43:02

129. Richard Fallon explains this partly as the product of a tradition of precedent and stare
decisis in which past legal interpretations constitute a source of legitimate authority. Fallon,
supra note 10, at 1793. It is also partly a product of strategic uses of illegitimacy. Id. at 1818
(“[W]hereas an ascription of legal legitimacy often claims less than that a judicial judgment was
correct, an allegation of illegitimacy almost invariably implies more than that a legal judgment
was merely incorrect.”).
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Restoring trust in the legitimacy of immigration enforcement will
be the central issue in the vitality of immigration detainers going forward with PEP implementation. The policy feedback between statelocal detainer practice and federal policy suggests how. While legitimacy and legality were intertwined, legitimacy became the central issue in the demise of Secure Communities. Legitimacy functioned in
tandem with lawsuits because the grave constitutional harms at issue
invoked legitimacy concerns; the Fourth Amendment is substantive
and also concerned with procedural due process, which is a core
component of legitimacy in Tom Tyler’s research. Litigation over FOIA
disclosures underscored mistrust of government motives, another key
component. It could also be that judicial declarations of a policy’s legality send signals about the policy’s legitimacy in a legal system governed by judicial norms that considers past legal interpretations a
source of legitimate authority.129 In either explanation, legality bolstered legitimacy by influencing state and local perceptions of federal
authority, not solely or automatically because a federal court bound
states and localities to the conclusion that state and local cooperation
with federal immigration detainers requests is illegal. Confronted with
a nonbinding federal policy that depends on voluntary cooperation for
its successful implementation, legality and legitimacy constitute one
another and together function as constraints on cooperative policymaking.
Given that PEP will inherit state and local skepticism of the Secure Communities program that it replaced, the Obama administration
has significant work to do around the use of executive action to
prompt states and counties to prolong custody beyond scheduled release. Presumably the DHS guidance stating that the Secure Communities program will be discontinued sends a message to those who
distrusted it that DHS is making a fresh start. As an L.A. Times article
said in its description of the policy change, “For the immigrant advocates who for years have been calling on President Obama to curtail
deportations, the Secure Communities program symbolized what was
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130. Kate Linthicum, Obama Ends Secure Communities Program as Part of Immigration
Action, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-1121-immigration-justice-20141121-story.html.
131. Id.
132. In the announcement, President Obama went on to compare his prioritization with the
kind of prioritization that all law enforcement undertakes, everyday (also in keeping with Tyler’s
legitimacy criteria of building identification with local/frontline officials). The President Speaks
on Fixing America’s Broken Immigration System, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2014)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/11/20/president-speaks-fixingamericas-broken-immigration-system.
133. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 831 (2015).
134. García Hernández qualifies the statement by saying that ICE is still off-course, even if
stepping in right direction. García Hernández, supra note 125.
135. Vigorous disagreement about the bigger picture of state involvement in local law enforcement and preemption battles dominates current literature. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 353–56 (2008); Margaret Hu,
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wrong with the nation’s immigration enforcement strategy.”130 As
Chris Newman of the National Day Laborer Organizing Network
(which had challenged Secure Communities in court) said, “There’s
finally recognition that the Secure Communities experiment was a failure.”131 Making substantive changes to an admittedly failed program
suggests respect for the rule of law and signals the federal government’s responsiveness to the content of the concerns, even if not all
of them. Whether critics will embrace Secure Communities’ replacement, which some derisively refer to as Pep-comm to underscore its
similarities to its predecessor, depends partly on its effectiveness and
fidelity to its stated objectives—the President’s focus on “Felons, not
families. Criminals, not children”132—and the fairness of its implementation among other things. As crime and immigration scholar Eisha
Jain notes, “[in] the immigration context, the link between arrests and
deportation can serve to legitimate immigration enforcement choices
by demonstrating that immigration enforcement officials are focusing
on ‘criminal aliens,’ and not on those who may be seen as having
more compelling claims to membership, such as long-term unauthorized immigrants who have had no contact with the criminal justice
system.”133 César García Hernández, a scholar of crime and immigration who is critical of civil detention generally, cautiously notes that
limitations on detainers that exempt those lacking criminal convictions
and national security risk represents “a step in the right direction” toward a less punitive immigration enforcement approach.134 While limitations on the scope of detainers and limitations on use will not
change the overarching structure of state-local-federal partnership in
immigration enforcement135 or the mission of targeting criminal aliens
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for deportation,136 they can reign in excess and safeguard against illegality. This will be especially true if ICE takes seriously the manner
of documenting and validating probable cause that an individual is
removable, perhaps by interposing an independent verifier of cause
that approximates the probable cause procedures to execute a warrant in criminal court.137 The probable cause showing and warrant is
garnering even more attention following San Francisco’s release of a
Juan Francisco Lopez-Sanchez, an undocumented immigrant with
prior felony convictions and removal orders, who killed U.S. citizen
Kathryn Steinle shortly after his release.138 Lopez-Sanchez was released from jail despite ICE’s requests to hold him pursuant to a local
sanctuary policy that prevented ICE holds without warrant on the
same day that PEP implementation was scheduled to begin. The
events sparked a firestorm of controversy over the balance of crime
control and community discretion in immigration enforcement that includes congressional hearings over mandatory federal immigration
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Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 627 (2012); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 34 (2007); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise
of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1560–64 (2007–08); Michael
J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 551–52 (2001). Cf. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 788 n.6 (2008); Martin, supra note
32, at 454–55 (believes in “carefully structured fed-state cooperation” and says PEP only makes
sense as an interim measure to “stop the bleeding”). The President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing generally questions the involvement of LEAs with federal immigration enforcement and
specifically recommends that ICE discontinues notification and transfer requests under PEP.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY
POLICING 18 (2015) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE].
136. See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1579–98 (2010) (on asymmetries of procedural protections in civil immigration enforcement); Ingrid Eagley, Prosecuting
Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. Rev. 1281, 1281 (2010); Steve Legomsky, Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 469–70 (2007). García Hernández says:
“PEP isn’t a panacea for the severity of modern immigration law enforcement. Many migrants
will still be sanctioned twice—once by the criminal justice system and a second time by the
immigration law regime. Hundreds of thousands will continue to find themselves sucked into the
immigration detention and removal pipeline annually.” García Hernández, supra note 125.
137. David Martin suggests that immigration judges or magistrate judges could perform
such a check. Martin, supra note 32, at 457.
138. Lee Romney et al., Fatal Shooting of S.F. Woman Reveals Disconnect Between ICE,
Local Police, L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-sf-shooting20150707-story.html.
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detainers,139 legislative proposals to suspend federal funding for localities with sanctuary policies,140 and community forums to re-evaluate sanctuary policies in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
elsewhere.141
The initial sentiment stirred up by Steinle’s killing—against Sanctuary Cities with noncooperation policies and in favor of more stringent federal immigration enforcement—has calmed as public
attention turns toward the presidential campaigns and other issues.
However, the pendulum shift is from opposition to the feds toward a
more balanced approach. Investigations into non-detainer policies following Steinle’s killing—in Los Angeles, for example, where ICE
agents have been readmitted to jails—mean that communities recognize they need to be active partners in policymaking, not merely protestors against federal policy. The kinds of policies they are setting in
place resemble the critical elements of PEP: a more fine-grained consideration of serious convictions in ICE’s decision to request cooperation and an equally-fine grained consideration on the part of local
jails to grant or not grant those requests.
Procedurally, the effect of the changed political climate is to bolster the credibility of ICE. The concerns about recidivism are not unfounded, as it turns out. DHS’ willingness to remain open to
community partnership, rather than cracking down, will be important
as communities formulate responses. Still, recognizing the lineage of
the two detainer programs, rather than reacting to the more recent
uproar over the Steinle killing, could ease PEP implementation on
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 32 Side A
12/28/2015 14:43:02

139. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson and ICE Director Sarah Saldana repeatedly emphasized
in their congressional testimony the need for “cooperation” with local authorities, rather than
mandatory immigration detention. Immigration Enforcement Oversight: Hearing on Immigration
Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Jeh Charles Johnson,
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security) (on video at http://www.c-span.org/video/?3270741/homeland-security-secretary-jeh-johnson-testimony-oversight-hearing).
140. Legislative proposals immediately following the Karthyn Steinle killing include passage
of H.R. 3009 Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act and proposed Kate’s Laws in the House
and Senate. H.R. 3009, 114th Cong. (2015). Congress’ efforts to enact legislation stalled upon
return from recess in fall 2015, with the failure of S.2146, 114th Cong. (2015).
141. Kate Linthicum & Lee Romney, L.A. County Considers New Immigration Program for
Jails in Light of S.F. Slaying, L.A. TIMES (July 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-immigration-jails-20150720-story.html; Laura M. Holson, San Francisco Votes the
Keep Shielding Immigrants From Deportation Officials, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/us/san-francisco-votes-to-keep-shielding-immigrantsfrom-deportation-officials.html?_r=2; Alice Popovici, Will Sanctuary Cities Survive, CRIME
REPORT (July 23, 2015), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/articles/2015-07-will-sanctuarycities-survive.
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procedural grounds.142 The noncooperation seen in the state and local resistance to Secure Communities presents a playbook for building PEP in its wake that is not significantly altered by recent events.
Immigrants’ rights advocates might continue to be skeptical of the sincerity or trustworthiness of ICE given the origins of the program, its
confusing and changing signals to community over Secure Communities implementation, its uneven execution of state-local cooperation
agreements, and its continued use of detainer techniques deemed
unfair to immigrants and damaging to community trust. Upon release
of PEP guidance, the ACLU and a dozen civil and immigrants’ rights
organizations issued a letter expressing concern to DHS Secretary
Jeh Johnson.143 The tenor of their objections are both substantive and
procedural, and their subtext suggests damaged relationships too
broken for repair. Chastened by the Steinle killing and hampered by
Congress’ proposals to penalize local communities for not cooperating with federal immigration enforcement and to strengthen federal
immigration enforcement by making detainers mandatory (rather than
continue down the path of making federal enforcement more reliant
on local cooperation through PEP), immigration advocates issued a
second letter reminding Congress that “[g]ood policies are made over
time, by examining our shared values and opinions, and by working
toward equality and justice for all people.”144 In other words, the immigration advocates caution overreacting to the Steinle killing with retributive policies, even as they recognize that rebuilding trust is an
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142. Legal analysts disagree about how similar PEP will be to Secure Communities. Martin,
supra note 32, at 457. The ACLU lays out an interpretation and approach toward PEP that would
improve upon Secure Communities. Memorandum from the Am. Civil Liberties Union on DHS’
Discontinued Secure Communities Program, Detainer Reforms, and PEP (Dec. 17, 2014) (on
file with the American Civil Liberties Union). Others have been more skeptical that there will be
a meaningful difference between the programs. IMMIGRATION LEGAL RES. CTR., ORGANIZER
ALERT: LIFE AFTER “PEP-COMM” 1, 2–3 (2014); Emily Creighton, Do the President’s New Enforcement Policies Really Mark the End of Secure Communities, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Dec. 30,
2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/12/30/do-the-presidents-new-immigration-policiesreally-mark-the-end-of-secure-communities/; Ted Hessen, Top Immigration Officials Pitch New
Fingerprint-Sharing Program To Wary Activists, FUSION (May 10, 2015), http://fusion.net/story/132279/top-immigration-officials-pitch-new-fingerprint-sharing-program-to-waryactivists/; Let’s Have a PEP Talk: Is this Secure Communities 2.0?, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG
(May 21, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/.
143. Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union et al., to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 17, 2015) (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union) (“Short of discontinuing detainers and notifications, ICE and the local law enforcement agencies that respond to
detainers or notifications will continue to incur liability for making illegal arrests and jeopardize
polic[e]-community trust.”).
144. Immigrants’ rights organizations, led by the National Immigration Law Center and
United We Dream, wrote in opposition to a House bill to block funding for sanctuary cities. See
Letter from Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., to Members of Cong. (July 20, 2015) (on file with author).
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145. Martin, supra note 32, at 438, 453 (auspicious conditions and gradual restoration of
wider cooperation).
146. Cristina Rodríguez, Toward Détente in Immigration Enforcement, 30 J. L. & POL. 505,
518 (2015) (manuscript 13–14).
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ongoing process. The sobering message from Steinle’s killing is that
cooperation is a two-way affair and protest by itself is not a policy.
They need to become partners in policymaking.
Troubled relationships can be rehabilitated and restored under
the right circumstances. Although they were writing before the Steinle
killing, David Martin and Cristina Rodríguez remain optimistic about
the promise of DHS’ revamped approach and community outreach. In
a recent article for a symposium journal, Martin holds out hope that
certain cooperative elements of Secure Communities that “thread the
needle” between LEAs overzealous immigration enforcement (relative to ICE priorities) and disruption of LEAs primary mission of criminal law enforcement by cities with noncooperation or sanctuary
policies could again be used under “more auspicious conditions.”145
By this Martin means changed political conditions that permit restoration of cooperative relationships in enforcement, such as a combination of reduced undocumented migration, broad legalization, and
resolute enforcement. What it takes to realize those conditions is hard
to predict, but the enhanced credibility of ICE’s mission and the desperate need for a coordinated approach toward enforcement after the
Steinle killing may turn out to be a critical ingredient. As Rodríguez
says in an article for the same symposium journal, “[n]ow that DHS
has reformulated its approach to enforcement in light of the multi-faceted criticism of Secure Communities, the turn toward cooperation
and away from confrontation requires local officials to respond in
kind.”146 Some immigration advocates will never sign on to a vision of
immigration enforcement involving active participation from LEAs, especially a vision involving civil detention. However, other immigration
advocates may move forward from the Steinle killing understanding
that cooperation is a two-way endeavor that involves the federal government reaching out just as much as it involves communities reaching back. Introspection within communities about what constitutes a
sanctuary city and which detainer policies strike the right balance between community trust, crime control, and cooperative immigration
enforcement is painful and involves not always constructive finger
pointing—feds versus states, county sheriffs versus city officials, us
versus them. But the more nuanced reflection about whether and how
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to engage with the DHS’ invitation to cooperate is a positive development, even if cities may not all decide to accept. Indeed, the lack of
uniformity is baked into the design of PEP; the Migration Policy Institute characterizes PEP’s ambitions as “replacing uniform national information-sharing and detainer models with individualized
jurisdictional protocols”, with the goal—but not the guarantee—of encouraging more counties to opt-in again.147
However communities respond to DHS’ invitation to cooperate
with its enforcement efforts, an invitation issued in earnest following
the Steinle killing that ironically occurred the same day that PEP was
scheduled for full implementation, DHS’ message that “we hear you”
aligns nicely with democratic norms that are both procedural and substantive in character. The framework of cooperation and the language
of partnership, seeking buy-in from the bottom-up, is also consistent
with the styles of regulatory responsiveness that have proved more
effective than old-styles of mandates and commands from the topdown.148 Demonstrating that the federal government is respecting
those not legally-bound to follow is particularly important for an executive action—an instrument vulnerable to claims of unilateralism,
usurpation, and overreaching. It builds the sense of the government’s
“respect-worthiness” and “responsiveness” and fosters cooperation.
The ICE Director who took charge shortly after the detainer policies
changed has not always done well on this front, and the Obama administration is showing that it takes seriously the need to maintain
improved relationships with its partners in crime control.149
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 33 Side B
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147. Marc Rosenblum, Understanding the Potential Impact of Executive Action on Immigration Enforcement, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (July 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/understanding-potential-impact-executive-action-immigration-enforcement.
148. John Braithwaite and Ian Ayres place such nonbinding guidance in the middle of a
pyramid of regulation that ranges from command and control to self-regulation. IAN AYRES &
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 19
(1992).
149. ICE Director Sarah Saldaña might have undermined some community trust when she
responded “Amen” to a congressional query about whether she thought Congress should “clarify the law” to require state and local law enforcement to lock up immigrants at the request of
ICE. Saldaña recanted the next day, conceding that her response contradicted Secretary Johnson’s observation that an increasing number of federal court decisions hold that detention based
on ICE requests to state and local law enforcement agencies violates the Fourth Amendment.
See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Statement from U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Director Sarah R. Saldaña (Mar. 20, 2015) (on file with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
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It is still too early to systematically study state and local responses to PEP implementation or opine on PEP’s successes or failures.150 Much will depend on the implementation of its provisions,
including novel ones calling for notification and vaguely familiar ones
that permit ICE holds under “special circumstances” and the manner
in which probable cause is documented and validated.151 No number
of released PEP forms can make that clear. Internal quality control
will remain an issue as LEAs exercise discretion as they implement
the new criteria. Also at issue will be the reaction of LEAs to ICE’s
requests under PEP, partly conditioned on the political and legal climate. As Jain notes,
enforcement necessarily depends on whether jails cooperate with
ICE notification requests prior to the release of inmates. Widespread refusal to comply with detainers played a role in undermining the efficacy of Secure Communities—a fact that ICE
acknowledged in transitioning to the Priority Enforcement Program.
If local law enforcement agencies continue to ignore ICE’s new requests for notification, then immigration enforcement officials will
have limited ability to apprehend suspected unauthorized immigrants, even after reviewing their arrest information.152
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150. Preliminary data show a decrease in ICE detainer requests under PEP, but local responses to those requests will require monitoring before patterns can be discerned. See Further
Decrease in ICE Detainer Use, TRAC REPORT (Aug. 28, 2015), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/402/.
151. César García Hernández and David Martin suggest that probable cause should be
strengthened for both ICE notification and ICE holds. García Hernández, supra note 125; Martin, supra note 32, at 455.
152. Jain, supra note 133, at 833.
153. Rosenblum, supra note 147.
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In other words, cooperation will fail. At the same time, local communities’ reflexive opposition to ICE requests will also impede trust
and effective policymaking. They need to show that they are being
reasonable for the DHS to remain open to their active partnership.
Already, immigration advocates are highlighting TRAC statistics
showing that requests for detainers under PEP may be down, but they
are not tailored to seriousness of convictions—meaning they would
not have prevented Steinle’s killing and that the decreased rates are
less important than the perceptions of fairness in the meting out of
detainer requests.153
Based on the legitimacy theory developed in this Article, state
and local responses to continuing federal requests for detention or
notification post-PEP could go a number of ways. LEAs may continue
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154. Around the same time that the Steinle murder took over headlines, the American Immigration Council released a much-publicized report showing that immigrants are typically not
criminals. See WALTER EWING ET AL., THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 1–2 (2015).
155. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE, supra note 7, at 32–45, 66 (Chapter 4: Cooperation
with legal authorities defined as the police, the courts, and the law).
156. This discussion of civic engagement overlaps Tom Tyler’s discussion of cooperation
with political authorities, e.g. when communities will go along with the president based on his
institutional authority, as opposed to when local officials will go along with federal immigration
officials based on the same. Id. at 81.
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to withhold cooperation for fear of continuing jurisdictional liability, unresolved concerns about the trustworthiness of ICE, or steadfast conviction about the futility of eroding trust between local police and
immigrant communities.154 Some LEAs might show greater cooperation with disciplined detainer requests that seem more legitimate on
procedural and substantive grounds, especially if ICE can establish
that they are tailoring requests and not merely lowering the overall
number of requests, or choose to cooperate when faced with threats
of legal or political reprisal for not doing so. Yet others might be less
cooperative with detainer requests on the theory that the federal government’s respect-worthiness is diminished by the DHS’ own admission that the Secure Communities program was illegitimately
administered and procedurally defective or that PEP implementation
remains insufficiently responsive to preexisting concerns. Congress’
divisive proposals to penalize Sanctuary Cities raise the stakes of
concession. Some might feel increased trust toward the federal government if it maintains the DHS’ more open and responsive style of
regulation, notwithstanding recent events. Only time will tell.
At the risk of overly speculating about whether states will cooperate with PEP, legitimacy theory sheds light on how they will make
their decisions. A recent strand of Tom Tyler’s legitimacy research
focuses on cooperation in the context of law enforcement and legal
authorities—defined as police, courts, and the law—rather than more
generalized settings such as traffic offenses, speeding tickets and
parking fines.155 As with the original research, Tyler’s new research is
designed to shed light on decisional factors beyond instrumental and
normative motivations. The new studies reveal two forms of voluntary
action that directly help the police, and legitimacy matters to them
both: (1) cooperation by voluntarily providing the police information
relevant to public safety objectives, and (2) civic engagement and
community investment in local police activities.156 In the context of
post-PEP immigration law enforcement, both types of discretion and
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157. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 135, at 1 (“When any part of the
American family does not feel like it is being treated fairly, that’s a problem for all of us.”).
158. Id. at 18; Letter from Am. Civil Liberties Union et al., to Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec. (June 17, 2015) (on file with the American Civil Liberties Union); Press Release, Judiciary Comm. Chairman Bob Goodlatte, Goodlatte: Implementation of Priority Enforcement Program Endangers Our Communities (June 23, 2015) (on file with the U.S. House
of Representatives).
159. Jerry Markon, Obama Administration Scales Back Deportations in Policy Shift, WASH.
POST. (July 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dhs-scales-back-deportationsaims-to-integrate-illegal-immigrants-into-society/2015/07/02/890960d2-1b56-11e5-93b75eddc056ad8a_story.html.
160. Similar empirical studies of 287(g) agreements exist. See HEATHER CREEK & STEPHEN
YODER, WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM OUR FEDS: UNDERSTANDING STATE/FEDERAL COOPERATION ON
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1–3 (2010); Katherine M. Donato et al., Police Arrests in a Time of
Uncertainty: Impact of 287(g) on Arrests in a New Immigrant Gateway, in AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1, 1
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voluntary cooperation are salient. PEP relies on counties and local
jails to voluntarily disclose critical information about immigration status in response to ICE’s request for notification of the impending release of persons they have probable cause to believe are removable
under the enforcement criteria. Prior experience with 287(g) agreements and other predecessors to the Secure Communities and PEP
programs have shown that ICE cannot obtain custody for civil immigration enforcement proceedings nearly as efficiently or effectively
without LEA-federal government partnership. On the issue of civic engagement and community investment, the promised openness of the
federal government to community input following the cessation of Secure Communities renders it keenly dependent on the community’s
opinions of the federal government’s reputation. Right now there is
disagreement within communities at-large about whether they ought
to encourage policies and practices of cooperation with detainers
post-PEP. The president’s Task Force on Policing names as Pillar
One in its report “building trust and legitimacy,” and it invokes Tyler’s
research for this philosophical foundation toward improved policing.157 The Task Force Report admonishes the DHS to decouple federal immigration enforcement and local policing activities, specifically
mentioning notifications and requests to transfer.158 Still, many
acknowledge that PEP coupled with the new enforcement priorities
represents a significant shift toward an immigration enforcement strategy that is more sensitive to the realities of undocumented migration,
fairer to long-time residents, and effective in crime control and community protection.159 The real test of PEP’s legitimacy, however, will
come once PEP is fully implemented in all jurisdictions and empirical
study can be undertaken of whether and why states and localities
choose to cooperate with it.160
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(2014); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE PERFORMANCE OF
287(g) AGREEMENTS: FY 2011 UPDATE (2011); MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(g) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 18–19 (2011)
(showing only half detained under 287(g) committed serious crime); Tara Watson, Enforcement
and Immigrant Location Choice (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19626,
2013) (287(g) task force model doubles likelihood of immigrants to move); Paul G. Lewis et al.,
Why Do Some City Police Departments Enforce Federal Immigration Law?, J. PUB. ADMIN. RES.
& THEORY 1, 10 (2012) (studying 2007-2008 police checks for violent crime versus traffic stops).
161. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Ultimately, the changing pattern of cooperation with Secure Communities on the basis of intertwining legitimacy and legality suggests
a policy cycle with substantive and procedural dimensions. The diffusion of substantive policy changes and procedural reforms from Secure Communities to its PEP replacement—and the interruption of
Steinle’s killing by an immigration release despite a detainer request—illustrates policy learning between federal, state, and county
government. The policy influence loops from the federal government
to states and localities (in the form of ICE detainer requests), from
states and localities back to the federal government (in policies that
accept, condition, or decline to follow detainer policy), and from the
federal government back to the states and localities (in PEP’s modified terms for detainer requests). Presumably policy will cycle again
as state responses to ICE detainer requests under PEP set the conditions for continuing requests. If states seem thoughtful and reasonable, ICE may meet them in turn; if they seem reflexive and
recalcitrant in spite of harmful events, ICE may become more indiscriminate in their requests. Ultimately, policy development may be
slowed but not stalled by shocks like the Steinle killing and congressional intervention. Once a policy cycle is in motion, its momentum is
not easily impeded, even if it is not unalterable.
Cooperative governance continually remakes immigration enforcement policy, adapting to changing political and legal conditions.
Immigration detainers provide a rich study of the process by which
these policies evolve. The study can and should be extended as PEP
is implemented in cities and counties across the nation. The combined case study heralds lessons for other federal laws calling upon
state and local cooperation for their successful execution. Within immigration law, that includes DACA and the still unfolding litigation over
the Deferred Action for Parental Arrivals (DAPA) program.161 States
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have shown broad acceptance of DACA in their policymaking on drivers’ licenses, higher education, and health care.162 Whether they will
continue to do so, if the injunction is lifted on the DAPA program, remains to be seen. It will depend critically on President Obama’s reputation after litigation that stirs up concerns about the legitimacy of
executive action. Beyond immigration, it includes health care and the
environment and other policies premised on executive actions and
reliant on state cooperation for their successful implementation. State
compliance with the Affordable Care Act has been uneven, with indications that President Obama’s forcefulness in pushing through the
legislation has had lasting consequences even as the Supreme Court
upholds the law’s legality.163 State cooperation with environmental
regulations after the Supreme Court’s limiting of agency power could
follow a parallel track to DAPA.164 Trust in the legitimacy of one’s policymaking partners matters wherever law hinges on public acceptance rather than solely on assertions of power, which is to say
legitimacy matters nearly everywhere.
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Chen, supra note 2.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
Mich. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
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